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Minimum Contacts in a Borderless 
World:  Voice over Internet Protocol 
and the Coming Implosion of Personal 
Jurisdiction Theory 
Danielle Keats Citron∗ 
Modern personal jurisdiction theory rests on the twin pillars of state 
sovereignty and due process.  A nonresident’s “minimum contacts” with a 
forum state are treated as the equivalent of her territorial presence in the state 
and hence justify a state’s exercise of sovereignty over her.  At the same time, the 
nonresident’s “purposeful availment” of opportunities within the state is seen as 
implying her agreement to that state’s jurisdiction in exchange for the 
protection of its laws.  This theory presumes that a nonresident directs voice 
communications to known places by dialing a telephone number’s area code. 
Voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) and the borderless communications of 
the twenty-first century belie this assumption.  Area codes will no longer 
reliably correspond to known locations; individuals can call, and do mischief in, 
a state without ever realizing that they are contacting that state.  With VoIP 
and its emerging applications, most means of interstate communications — 
voice, fax, file-sharing, e-mail, and real-time video conferencing — will lack 
geographic markers. 
The U.S. Supreme Court will be forced to choose which value is paramount:  
state sovereignty or the implied contract approach to due process.  In a few cases 
arising from cellular phone calls, lower courts have privileged the implied 
contract theory.  This effectively returns the law of personal jurisdiction to the 
nineteenth century formalism of Pennoyer v. Neff by limiting jurisdiction to 
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defendants’ home states in cases arising from harmful communications.  This 
evisceration of state sovereignty is unwarranted.  Other means can protect a 
nonresident defendant from abusive process.  Securing state sovereignty over 
harmful borderless communications promotes a healthy federalism, reconciling 
seemingly inconsistent centrifugal and centripetal themes in the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................. 1483 
 I. VOIP:  COMMUNICATIONS IN A BORDERLESS WORLD..................... 1488 
 A. The Traditional Telephone System............................................. 1488 
 B. VoIP ........................................................................................... 1491 
 1. What Is VoIP? .................................................................... 1491 
 2. The Borderless Nature of VoIP Communications ........ 1493 
 a. Area Codes No Longer Signal Geographic 
Locations...................................................................... 1494 
 b. The Mobility of VoIP.................................................. 1495 
 c. VoIP’s Routing Features ............................................ 1497 
 3. SoIP:  VoIP’s Future.......................................................... 1498 
 II. THE TRADITIONALLY HARMONIOUS PRINCIPLES OF TERRITORIAL 
CONTACT AND IMPLIED CONTRACT CLASH IN BORDERLESS 
COMMUNICATION CASES.................................................................. 1501 
 A. Twin Pillars:  Territorial Sovereignty and Implied Contract in 
the Theory of Personal Jurisdiction ............................................ 1504 
 1. State Sovereignty:  The Significance of Territoriality 
in the Minimum Contacts Doctrine................................ 1504 
 2. Due Process Limits:  The Implied Contract Theory in 
Modern Personal Jurisdiction Law................................. 1516 
 3. Additional Due Process Limits:  “Fair Play and 
Substantial Justice” Concerns.......................................... 1520 
 B. The Purposefulness Inquiry Presumes that Telephones Direct 
Communications to Single, Identifiable Locations..................... 1522 
 C. Cellular Phone Cases:  Struggling to Apply the Minimum 
Contacts Doctrine to Borderless Communications .................... 1527 
 III. REBUILDING PERSONAL JURISDICTION THEORY FOR A 
BORDERLESS WORLD......................................................................... 1529 
 A. The Twin Pillars Applied to VoIP Communications:  The 
Threat to Extraterritorial Personal Jurisdiction and a Return 
to Pennoyer............................................................................... 1530 
 
 
  
2006] Minimum Contacts in a Borderless World 1483 
 B. Privileging State Sovereignty Promotes Efficient Litigation 
and Notions of Judicial Federalism and National Citizenship ... 1533 
 1. The Purposefulness Inquiry Will Generate Satellite 
Litigation ............................................................................ 1534 
 2. Constructive Presence Brings Together Some 
Otherwise Disparate Values Animating Judicial 
Federalism and National Citizenship............................. 1535 
 C. Alternative Means for Protecting Nonresidents from a 
Sovereign State’s Unreasonable Exercise of Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction................................................................................. 1538 
CONCLUSION................................................................................................. 1542 
INTRODUCTION 
Under the “minimum contacts” doctrine, a state’s ability to subject 
nonresidents to its courts’ jurisdiction rests on the state’s sovereignty 
over the nonresidents’ litigation-related activities within its territory.1  
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, limits 
a state’s adjudicative authority to nonresidents whose purposeful 
affiliation with the state suggests their implicit agreement to the state’s 
exercise of jurisdiction over them.2  In practice, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has crafted its sovereignty and due process doctrines to complement one 
another:  it deems valid the exercise of state sovereignty consonant with 
due process and defines any attempt to exceed the bounds of state 
sovereignty as offensive to due process. 
Much of this is accomplished through the device of implied contract.  
In the traditional, circuit-switched telephone system, a New Yorker 
dialing a phone number with a San Francisco area code3 indicates her 
intent to connect with California and her implied agreement to subject 
herself to California’s courts.4  For more than half a century, the law of 
personal jurisdiction harmoniously rested on the twin pillars of 
 
 1 See infra notes 90-170 and accompanying text (exploring territorial contact 
requirement of minimum contacts doctrine and its state sovereignty justification). 
 2 See infra notes 171-93 and accompanying text (describing purposeful availment 
requirement of minimum contacts doctrine and its implied contract rationale). 
 3 See ALLIANCE FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY SOLUTIONS, NPA ALLOCATION 
PLAN AND ASSIGNMENT GUIDELINES 5 (2002), https://www.atis.org/atis/docstore/ 
doc_display.asp?ID=312 (explaining that first three digits of phone numbers in ten-digit 
North American Numbering Plan traditionally correspond to “distinct exclusive 
geographic areas, commonly referred to as area codes”). 
 4 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (finding that 
nonresidents purposefully direct activities to state and thus warrant state’s personal 
jurisdiction over them “by mail[ing] and wir[ing] communications across state lines”). 
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territorial contact and implied contract.5 
A new and rapidly expanding technology, Voice over Internet 
Protocol (“VoIP”), tears those two pillars apart.  In a trend presaged by 
cellular phone technology,6 VoIP and the impending Services over the 
Internet Protocol (“SoIP”)7 will transmit all remote communications — 
voice, fax, e-mail, file-sharing, and real-time video conferencing — to 
Internet telephony subscribers at any broadband-accessible location.8  
Whereas AT&T created a tightly controlled telephone system in which 
phone calls follow dedicated circuits, Internet telephony providers 
 
 5 This Article focuses exclusively on VoIP’s impact on questions of specific 
jurisdiction under the minimum contacts doctrine.  Under current theory, the exercise of 
specific jurisdiction over nonresident defendants hinges on two critical factors:  the 
nonresidents’ purposeful connection with the forum state that suggests their enjoyment of 
the forum’s laws and implicit agreement to face litigation there and the nonresidents’ 
litigation-raising activity in the forum.  See, e.g., id. at 473 n.15, 476.  The minimum contacts 
doctrine also sanctions “general jurisdiction” over a nonresident.  This theory permits a 
forum’s courts to hear any cause of action against a nonresident defendant, no matter 
where the cause of action arises, because the defendant is considered a local player in the 
state either due to her residence there or, as to a corporation, due to its incorporation in the 
state or maintenance of its principal place of business there.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 
(9th Cir. 1998).  Because general jurisdiction theory is not predicated on principles of 
implied contract and litigation-related territorial contact, this Article only addresses 
specific jurisdiction and the impending schism in its theoretical underpinnings that VoIP-
contact cases will provoke. 
 6 Cellular phones and call forwarding have served as precursors to VoIP by 
disconnecting voice communications from presumed, fixed locations.  Although a cellular 
phone’s area code signals its owner’s location at the time of the phone’s purchase, cellular 
phones are mobile.  Thus, calls to cellular phones may be answered in geographic locations 
that differ from the location suggested by their phone numbers’ area codes.  VoIP blazes a 
new trail in disconnecting all of our communications (i.e., voice, fax, e-mail, file-sharing, 
and real-time video conferencing) from specific locations by eliminating the geographic 
significance of area codes and by destroying the notion that remote communications will be 
received in predictable locations.  While this Article addresses the implications of cellular 
phone contacts for the personal jurisdiction doctrine, those contacts alone might not prove 
fatal to the current regime.  This Article focuses on VoIP and its future applications because 
their complete lack of territoriality inevitably leads to a schism between the territorial 
contact and implied contract principles in the modern minimum contacts doctrine. 
 7 See infra notes 63-72 (describing future applications of VoIP known as SoIP). 
 8 See First Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking In re IP-Enabled 
Services and E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, FCC 05-116, at 33 
(F.C.C.R. June 3, 2005) [hereinafter FCC Order], available at http://www.fcc.gov/ 
cgb/voip911order.pdf (highlighting “lack of geographic restrictions” as central customer 
benefit of VoIP).  VoIP and wireless technologies facilitate multiple forms of collaboration 
in real time, without regard to geography, distance, or in the near future, even language.  
See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT:  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 165-70 (2005); Simon Tuck, Jobs at Risk if CRTC Regulates VoIP, GLOBE & MAIL 
(Toronto), Sept. 22, 2004, at B7 (“[G]eography and borders are irrelevant when it comes to 
[VoIP] services.”). 
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designed VoIP to overcome the limitations of geography, “not to track 
it.”9 
VoIP telephone numbers are not physically linked to fixed locations, 
like a customer’s kitchen or office, as they would be in the traditional 
telephone system.10  Instead, VoIP numbers attach to people, wherever 
they may be.11  Thus, VoIP subscribers can select area codes for their 
VoIP numbers that have no connection to the actual location of their 
residence or office and can program their VoIP service to route their calls 
to numbers in different states simultaneously.12  As noted by the 
cofounder of the Internet Telephony Service Providers Association, 
Internet telephony creates an atmosphere of “the Wild West,” where 
“monitor[ing] borders”13 is impossible.  In a VoIP-connected world, 
individuals can no longer direct their communications to identifiable 
places.14 
Consider this example.  A Pennsylvania company uses VoIP phone 
numbers with New York and New Jersey area codes in the hopes of 
attracting business there.  On the president’s desk in Philadelphia rings a 
 
 9 Cheryl A. Tritt, Telecommunications Future, in 22ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY & REGULATION 245, 253 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 3202, 2004) (distinguishing 
traditional, circuit-switched telephony, which establishes “dedicated circuit between the 
parties,” from VoIP technology, which instead converts voice and fax communications into 
data packets and sends data all over Internet to be regathered and ordered for recipient’s 
telephone or computer). 
 10 Compare LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:  THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 31 (2001) (discussing traditional telephone system that connected 
individuals in fixed locations), and WILLIAM MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS:  SPACE, PLACE, AND 
THE INFOBAHN 9 (1995) (asserting that telephone calls and fax transmissions “link specific 
machines at identifiable locations,” such as “telephone on your desk and telephone on my 
desk”), with infra notes 35-62 and accompanying text (exploring geography-defying nature 
of VoIP). 
 11 See infra notes 27-62 and accompanying text (describing VoIP technology). 
 12 See Ian Urbina, Area Codes, Now Divorced from Their Areas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, at 
B1 (explaining that Internet telephony has torn area codes from geography, allowing 
people to have phone numbers with area codes that bear no connection to where 
subscribers live or work); see also infra notes 38-46 (describing VoIP area codes).  As Ian 
Urbina notes:  “It used to be safe to assume that dialing 212 made a phone ring in 
Manhattan.  Press 212 these days, and someone may answer in Tokyo.”  Urbina, supra. 
 13 Helen Beckett, Small Firms Go First, COMPUTER WKLY., May 3, 2005, at 48.  As the 
CEO of Vonage has explained, VoIP aims to decouple communications from localities.  
Martin Sims, The Market Will Provide, INTERMEDIA, Feb. 1, 2005, at 6. 
 14 See MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 4 (explaining that Internet-based instruments sever 
human interaction from fixed locations); Urbina, supra note 12, at B1 (noting that, in 
contrast to traditional telephone conversations where “[c]allers used to know where they 
were calling but not necessarily who would pick up,” “the reverse is now true,” as area 
codes assigned to cellular and VoIP phones move with user). 
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phone call to the company’s New York phone number from a Michigan 
resident.  If their conversation gives rise to tort and contract claims, 
where can the company sue the Michigander?  The Michigander 
believed that he contacted a New Yorker based on the telephone number 
that he dialed, when, in fact, his activities were directed toward 
Pennsylvania.  Although the Michigander’s phone call may have caused 
harm in Pennsylvania, the Michigander had no warning of his 
involvement with Pennsylvania and did not seek out the benefits and 
protections of its laws. 
Thus, if “purposeful connection” and its implied contract rationale 
remain a prerequisite for jurisdiction, the Michigander cannot be sued in 
Pennsylvania for the harm he allegedly did there.  The Michigander 
thought he was contacting New York, yet no New York people, places, 
or equipment were involved.  This leaves New York with no justification 
for exercising sovereignty over these events and may force the 
Pennsylvania firm to go to Michigan to sue.  The long arm of the law just 
got a great deal shorter. 
This Article demonstrates how the geography-defying nature of VoIP 
puts the previously harmonious principles underlying the minimum 
contacts doctrine, territorial contact and implied contract, into 
irreconcilable conflict.  This clash will force the Supreme Court to 
reconstruct its theory of personal jurisdiction for VoIP-related contacts 
from the ground up.  In the fifteen years since the Court last considered 
personal jurisdiction, communication technologies have changed 
radically.  Neither the Supreme Court nor scholars have responded to 
these changes. 
This Article seeks to fill that void.  If an individual can have contacts 
with a state while not purposefully availing herself of opportunities in 
that state, which principle controls?  Is the law of personal jurisdiction 
fundamentally about a state’s sovereignty over a nonresident’s territorial 
acts within that state’s borders?  Or does it derive its core justification 
from implied contract?  One answer allows an individual to be tricked 
into litigating in a forum she had hoped to avoid; the other deprives a 
state of the ability to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident whose 
litigation-related activity caused harm within that state’s territory. 
Part I describes how VoIP creates a borderless world of 
communications that differs from the controlled architecture of the 
traditional telephone system.  It looks at VoIP’s underlying technology, 
its defining features, and its geography-defying nature.  It concludes by 
describing SoIP, which will expand the nature and ease of VoIP 
communications, likely enhancing VoIP’s popularity and ultimately 
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destroying the notion of location-specific communications. 
Part II dissects the concepts that have traditionally provided 
normative support for the minimum contacts doctrine — a nonresident’s 
territorial contact and implied contract.  It explores how, when the Court 
designed the minimum contacts doctrine, individuals at a distance 
contacted each other from known locations, through the mail or the 
telephone.  This ensured that a defendant would establish her in-forum 
presence in the same state she impliedly agreed to contact.  In cases 
arising from mobile communications, the concepts of territorial contact 
and implied contract directly conflict due to a nonresident caller’s 
inability to identify, and thus to consent to have contact with, the 
particular state where the cellular phone user received the nonresident’s 
call.  This conflict has driven some state courts to the extreme step of 
declaring all calls to cellular phone users jurisdictionally insignificant, no 
matter the harm those calls inflict. 
Part III demonstrates how VoIP communications will ripen this clash 
of principles and offers a possible solution to that conflict.  It contends 
that, because VoIP area codes are not designed to reflect subscribers’ 
geographic locations, the twin principles of territorial contact and 
implied contract inevitably will clash.  If the personal jurisdiction 
doctrine fundamentally concerns an implied private agreement between 
a nonresident and the forum, the state will be stripped of its adjudicatory 
authority over a nonresident’s calls to VoIP subscribers within its 
borders.  In effect, personal jurisdiction law will revert to the formalism 
of Pennoyer v. Neff15 that the Court rejected six decades ago.  On the other 
hand, if the minimum contacts theory primarily serves to guarantee a 
state’s sovereign authority over activities within its territory, a 
nonresident may be sued in a forum she had no reason to know she had 
contacted. 
Part III urges that the implied contract rationale of the purposefulness 
inquiry cannot and should not be sustained in a VoIP-connected world.  
The alternative would be for the law of personal jurisdiction to abandon 
efforts to fairly allocate state adjudicative authority over interstate 
activities causing harm within a state’s borders in favor of the 
elimination of that authority in cases arising from VoIP communications.  
This part contends that a nonresident’s due process rights can be secured 
without sacrificing a state’s judicial authority.  This can be accomplished 
by assessing the state’s regulatory interest in the nonresident’s litigation-
related forum activity to ensure the reasonableness of the state’s exercise 
 
 15 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
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of judicial jurisdiction over the nonresident.  Part III concludes by 
arguing that such a reconstituted minimum contacts doctrine would 
protect a nonresident defendant’s due process rights while honoring a 
state’s sovereignty over that defendant’s communications transmitted to 
its territory. 
I. VOIP:  COMMUNICATIONS IN A BORDERLESS WORLD 
The Supreme Court developed its current personal jurisdiction 
doctrine at a time when communications over the traditional, circuit-
switched telephone system connected individuals in fixed and 
identifiable geographic locations.  This part describes that system and 
how, in the fifteen years since the Supreme Court last ruled on personal 
jurisdiction, communication technologies have undergone revolutionary 
change with the adoption of cellular phones and the emergence of VoIP 
technology.  If individuals and businesses increasingly trade in their 
traditional telephones to enjoy the low cost, efficiency, and future 
applications of VoIP as analysts predict, all of the ways in which we 
establish a virtual presence in far-flung places — voice, fax, e-mail, file-
sharing, and real-time video — will lack geographic markers.  With 
VoIP, only people matter. 
A. The Traditional Telephone System 
Although Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone in 1876, 
AT&T did not succeed in building a long-distance telephone network 
that reached half of American households until the 1950s.16  In the 
traditional system that AT&T established, Plain Old Telephone Service 
(“POTS”), telephones transmit voices over underground or aboveground 
wiring and cables to the Public Switched Telephone Network (“PSTN”).17  
PSTN employs a circuit-switching technology that connects the calling 
 
 16 See ANITA LOUISE MCCORMICK, THE INVENTION OF THE TELEGRAPH AND THE 
TELEPHONE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 79-88 (2004) (describing Alexander Graham Bell’s 1876 
invention of telephone and development of telephone system by companies Bell founded).  
By the 1960s, the telephone system linked 85% of American homes.  LESSIG, supra note 10, 
at 29. 
 17 STEPHEN J. BIGELOW ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TELEPHONE ELECTRONICS 4-8 (4th ed. 
2001).  The PSTN began as a human-operated, analog switching system with operators 
connecting calls using cords attached to a switchboard.  See NATHAN J. MULLER, DESKTOP 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 737 (2d ed. 2000).  Over the years, the system 
turned to electromechanical switching, eliminating the need for operators to connect every 
call.  Id.  Today, the switching system is completely electronic and digital.  Id. 
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phone to the called phone.18  Connections between callers are maintained 
over copper wires or fiber-optic cables.19  This system persists today, 
little changed from when AT&T designed it in the first part of the last 
century.  On the traditional telephone network, it is usually possible to 
determine the “jurisdiction of the traffic on a call-by-call basis” because 
the carrier provides a “physical connection to the end user and can 
determine where the user is located.”20 
In the PSTN, area codes indicate a telephone or fax user’s specific 
geographic location.21  In the 1990s, the North American Numbering Plan 
 
 18 MULLER, supra note 17, at 736. 
 19 See Konrad L. Trope, Voiceover Internet Protocol:  The Revolution in America’s 
Telecommunications Restructuring Infrastructure, in 25TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER & 
INTERNET LAW 55, 59-60, 72 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. 
Course Handbook Series No. 5994, 2005) (noting that analog telephone calls “require voice 
signals from each conversation to flow on a single circuit”). 
 20 Petition for Vonage Holdings Corp. for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of 
the Minn. Public Utilities Comm’n, No. P6214/C-03-108, at 28 (Sept. 22, 2003), available at 
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=651518
2877.  In the PSTN, every phone call is switched through a series of telephone company 
central offices until a dedicated path connects the calling and called parties.  See Jeff Smith, 
Qwest Rolls Out Internet Phone Service, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), May 10, 2005, at 1B.  
This path, or circuit, “stays in place for the duration of the conversation.”  MULLER, supra 
note 17, at 736.  Although the telephone network has been digitized in certain regions, the 
fiber optic cables that have replaced the copper wires in the analog system connect callers 
and recipients with the same circuit-switching technology.  JOSEPH A. PECAR & DAVID A. 
GARBIN, THE NEW MCGRAW-HILL TELECOM FACTBOOK 187 (2d ed. 2000).  Describing the 
traditional, circuit-switched telephone system, Professor Lessig noted that “when you 
called someone in Paris, a circuit was opened between you and Paris . . . .  You could trace 
the line of copper that linked you to Paris; along that line of copper, all your conversation 
would travel.”  LESSIG, supra note 10, at 31; see also Tom Farley, Digital Wireless Basics, 
http://www.privateline.com/PCS/history11.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2006) (analogizing 
PSTN system to railroad, noting that “[i]t’s like having a dedicated railroad track with only 
one train, your call, permitted on the track at a time”). 
 21 See Wikipedia, North American Numbering Plan, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
North_American_Numbering_Plan (last visited Feb. 14, 2006).  AT&T designed the North 
American Numbering Plan (“NANP”) in 1947 to facilitate direct dialing between 
individuals in different regions in the country without the assistance of an operator.  Id.  
Particular geographic regions were assigned new or additional area codes to ensure that 
populated regions of the country had ample available telephone numbers to distribute to 
telephone subscribers.  Id.  The NANP originally assigned 86 area codes; each area code 
corresponded to a specific geographic region in the country.  Id.  The most populated areas 
received area code numbers that took the shortest time to dial on rotary phones (e.g., New 
York City was assigned 212, a total of 5 clicks on the rotary phone, whereas Vermont 
received 802, which amounted to 20 clicks).  Id.; see Urbina, supra note 12 (describing that 
when area codes were invented, all 86 original area codes covered “single continuous 
regions” with 914 as only exception since it “encompassed two parts of downstate New 
York separated by Queens and the Bronx:  Westchester County and the area now served by 
845, and Nassau and Suffolk Counties”). 
   Interestingly, the local Bell telephone companies initially used the names of 
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Administrator assigned new area codes to densely populated geographic 
regions to accommodate the increasing demand for available phone 
numbers.22  All of the new area codes corresponded to geographic 
locations, except for toll-free area codes and fee-for-service codes.23  
Cellular phone companies also assign geographic area codes to their 
phones based on their subscribers’ residence or office on the date they 
purchased their mobile phones.24 
 
telephone subscribers, not numbers, to guide the switchboards.  See JOHN BROOKS, 
TELEPHONE:  THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 74 (1976).  The companies only replaced the names 
with numbers in 1879 to prevent mistakes by substitute telephone operators who were not 
familiar with the names of the callers and the jacks assigned to them on the switchboard.  
Id.  (explaining that, in 1879, local epidemic struck town of Lowell, Massachusetts, 
prompting town physician to urge local Bell company management to change telephone 
subscribers’ designation from their names to numbers so that if town’s four telephone 
operators fell ill, switchboard service would not be paralyzed due to substitute operators 
who did not know names that corresponded with each of 200 jacks).  The local Bell 
company management initially objected to switching the identification of its subscribers 
from names to numbers because it believed that “customers would consider their 
designation by numbers to be beneath their dignity.”  Id. 
 22 See Wikipedia, supra note 21.  From 1984 to 1994, only nine new area codes were 
added to the NANP.  See Urbina, supra note 12, at B1.  Today, many U.S. cities have more 
than one area code, either by splitting the city into different areas or by providing more 
than one code for the same geographical area.  Id.  For example, the NANP initially 
assigned 212 as the area code for telephone subscribers in New York City, but added two 
more area codes, 917 and 646, to accommodate consumer demand.  Id. 
 23 See Wikipedia, supra note 21.  Toll-free numbers like 800, 877, and 866 “are not 
issued to actual areas.”  Id. 
 24 The NANP system does not maintain “separate, non-geographic area codes” for 
cellular phones as do most European countries.  Id.  Because cellular phones receive the 
same “locality-specific codes as landlines,” cellular phone users are billed at the same rate 
as traditional telephones.  Id.  But unlike traditional telephones, cellular phones are mobile, 
wireless devices that operate as sophisticated radios, transmitting signals via a network of 
transmitters and antennae over limited geographic areas or “cells.”  Lana Mobydeen, Reach 
Out and Touch Someone:  Cellular Phones Health, Safety and Reasonable Regulation, 16 J.L. & 
HEALTH 373, 375 (2001).  Calls made over cellular phones are transmitted to a mobile 
telephone switching office, which then connects calls to local telephone companies that 
route them to a long distance carrier or the ultimate recipient.  Id. at 375-76.  As cellular 
customers move from one geographic location to another, the call is passed from “cell” to 
“cell” without service interruption.  ROBERT A. STEUERNAGEL, THE CELLULAR CONNECTION 
10-12 (4th ed. 2000).  Thus, individuals calling cellular phones have no assurance about the 
actual location of the cellular phone users they call since a cellular phone’s area code only 
suggests the location of the cellular phone subscriber at the time she purchased the phone, 
not where she travels at any given time.  See Allan Saxe, Can You Hear Me Now?, FORT 
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 7, 2004, at B9, available at 2004 WLNR 1812040. 
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B. VoIP 
1. What Is VoIP? 
VoIP and the cellular phone technology that preceded it 
fundamentally change our communications.25  Before VoIP and the 
widespread adoption of cellular phones, the PSTN exclusively carried 
voice communications, while the Internet separately connected 
computers to facilitate the sharing of data applications like e-mail, 
spreadsheets, pictures, music, and e-commerce.26  But VoIP technology 
brings together voice, fax, and data communications in a single device, 
routing them over the Internet to intended recipients.27 
 
 25 Although VoIP telephony was invented nearly 10 years ago, it “penetrated mass 
consumer consciousness” in 2004 when the availability of high-speed Internet access made 
VoIP telephony services fast, cheap, and reliable.  See Glyn Moody, VoIP on the Line, 
NETCRAFT, June 14, 2004, http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2004/06/index.html (“[i]n 
the early years of the Internet as a mass medium, the average user’s dial-up connection was 
too slow” for voice to be clearly transmitted over Internet and “variable net reliability 
meant that packets were often delayed or dropped, leading to chopped speech, audio 
artifacts and noticeable delays”); Ellen Muraskin, An Explosive Year for VoIP, EWEEK.COM, 
Nov. 25, 2004, available at http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1730777,00.asp.  This 
past year, the number of VoIP providers has greatly increased.  See Ken Belson, Cable’s New 
Pitch:  Reach Out and Touch Someone, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2005, at A5 (noting that traditional 
phone companies like Verizon, AT&T, and SBC Communications are developing Internet-
based phone services); Muraskin, supra.  The Federal Communications Commission’s 
(“FCC’s”) “hands-off policy on VoIP regulation” also encouraged more providers to enter 
the marketplace this year.  Id.; see In re Vonage Holdings Corp., 19 F.C.C.R. 22,404, 22,425 
(2004) (deeming state regulation of VoIP services preempted by Telecommunications Act of 
1996, which gave FCC exclusive jurisdiction over information services like VoIP).  The FCC 
has explained that its ruling “clears the way for increased investment and innovation in 
services like Vonage’s to the benefit of American consumers.”  Id. at 22,405. 
 26 See Ron Vidal, Enhancing 911:  How VoIP Technology Can Improve Public Safety, 
TELECOMM. MAG., Sept. 2004, at 1, available at http://www.level3.com/userimages/ 
dotcom/pdf/Enhancing_911_White_Paper.pdf. 
 27 See Daniel Terdiman, Internet Phones Arrive at Home (And Some Need No Computer), 
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2005, at C9 (describing how VoIP technology allows telephone 
conversations to be made across Internet rather than exclusively over regular phone lines); 
see also Scott Kirsner, Hold the Phone, FAST CO., Mar. 2004, at 96, available at http:// 
pf.fastcompany.com/magazine/80/telephony.html (noting that Internet-based phones can 
display webpages on their screens, allowing companies to publish data to their employees’ 
phones); Neil Randall, CNET Review of AT&T CallVantage, CNET.COM, Mar. 22, 2005, 
http://reviews.cnet.com/AT_T_CallVantage/4505-9238_7-30923419-2.html?tag=glance 
(explaining that AT&T’s CallVantage VoIP service allows subscribers to send faxes over 
VoIP phones); Texas Instruments, VoIP Solutions:  Overview Webpage, 
http://focus.ti.com/docs/apps/catalog/overview/overview.jhtml? templateId=975&path 
=templatedata/cm/level1/data/bband_voip_ovw (last visited Feb. 12, 2006) (advertising 
Texas Instrument’s VoIP software as enabling equipment manufacturers to develop 
products that send real-time voice, fax, and data over packet networks). 
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VoIP technology operates by converting analog signals (e.g., voice or 
fax) into digital data packets28 and by transmitting the data to a recipient 
over the Internet Protocol (“IP”) network.29  VoIP subscribers send faxes, 
make unlimited local and long-distance phone calls, and send data for a 
low monthly fee30 through their personal computers and laptops,31 
 
 28 Dan Gillmore, Give Swedish Firms Credit for VoIP Underlying Software, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, June 13, 2004, at 1F.  Whereas the circuit-switched telephone system keeps 
a dedicated line open between two callers over copper wires or fiber-optic cables, VoIP’s 
packet-switching system breaks data into small packets, attaching an IP-address to each 
packet that tells the network the data packet’s final destination.  See Jeff Tyson & Robert 
Valdes, How VoIP Works, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/ip-telephony.htm (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2006).  While the packets may travel different paths to their final 
destination, the receiving computer or phone reassembles the data packets into their 
original state for the recipient.  Id. 
 29 See Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle:  Internet Architecture and 
the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 840 (2004) (describing IP layer of Internet).  IP 
describes the way in which packets of data (i.e., small groups of bits and bytes) are sent and 
received over the Internet.  See Russell Shaw, Say Hello to VoIP, TECHLIVING, Apr. 20, 2005, 
at 56, available at http://www.techliving.com/article/829.html (explaining that data-packet 
transfer over IP occurs in same way with voice and fax as it does when downloading 
webpage or sending and receiving e-mails).  The IP network moves data packets without 
geo-location information, “reveal[ing] nothing about the user . . . and very little about the 
data exchanged.”  LAWRENCE L. LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 32 (1999).  
The geographic location of the sender and recipient is not “known by the system or 
knowable by us in looking at the data.”  Id. at 32.  Such a minimalistic design ensures 
network efficiency.  Id. at 33.  Professor Lawrence Lessig aptly summarizes the design of IP 
as “a carnival funhouse, with the lights dimmed to darkness and voices coming from 
around you but from people you do not know and from places you cannot identify.”  Id. 
 30 See Belson, supra note 25, at A5.  Fees vary depending on the services purchased by 
the user.  For example, AT&T CallVantage subscribers pay $29.99 per month for unlimited 
local and long distance calls.  See Randall, supra note 27.  Vonage’s Premium Unlimited 
Plan costs $24.99 per month for unlimited calls anywhere in the United States and Canada, 
voicemail, caller ID, call forwarding, and 3-way calling.  See Vonage Homepage, 
http://www.vonage.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2006); see also Texas Instruments, supra note 
27 (explaining that VoIP services offered by Texas Instruments eliminates per-minute long-
distance fees associated with traditional, circuit-switched telephone service). 
 31 VoIP subscribers can make phone calls over their computers in two ways.  First, 
VoIP providers like Vonage provide their customers with VoIP software that enables users 
to place calls from their computers so long as they have a headset, a microphone, and a 
connection to the Internet.  See Tyson & Valdes, supra note 28.  Second, companies like 
Skype offer free software that connects voice communications over PCs that use Skype 
software.  See Skype, Hello.  We’re Skype and We’ve Got Something We’d Like to Share 
with You Webpage, http://www.skype.com/products/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).  
Subscribers talk into microphones or headsets attached to their computers, and the Skype 
software digitizes the analog voice signals into data packets and distributes the data over 
the Internet to end-users.  Id.  Users cannot call out to numbers with NANP area codes 
unless they have signed up for additional paid plans like SkypeOut that allow subscribers 
to call those numbers on a per-minute basis.  Id.  In addition to voice telephony, the Skype 
software permits subscribers to share files and send instant messages.  Id.; see Craig Ellison,  
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traditional telephones,32 and IP-enabled or wireless phones.33 
2. The Borderless Nature of VoIP Communications 
As VoIP telephone numbers are tied to subscribers, VoIP transmits 
voice, fax, and data communications without regard to geography by 
enabling subscribers to select any desired area code for their phone 
numbers.34  VoIP subscribers also may bring their office and home phone 
numbers with them wherever they travel.35  VoIP technology removes 
the barriers of location imposed on voice and fax communications in the 
traditional telephone system36 by allowing subscribers to send faxes and 
make phone calls contingent only on high-speed Internet availability.37 
 
Talk Is Cheaper, PC MAG., Feb. 8, 2005, at 108 (describing Skype’s computer telephony 
service). 
 32 Tyson & Valdes, supra note 28.  After signing up with VoIP providers, subscribers 
need a high-speed Internet connection, a telephone adapter, and a conventional analog 
phone to activate their VoIP service.  See Ellison, supra note 31, at 108. 
 33 Tyson & Valdes, supra note 28.  An IP phone looks just like a normal phone with a 
handset and cradle but is connected to the Internet by an RJ-45 Ethernet connector.  Id.; see 
also Terdiman, supra note 27, at C9 (explaining that IP phones work by connecting Ethernet 
cable from broadband source into RJ-45 Ethernet IP phone and another Ethernet cable from 
IP to PC).  Wi-Fi IP phones are also available, allowing subscribing callers to make VoIP 
calls from any Wi-Fi hot spot.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 165 (discussing how VoIP 
permits users to talk, fax, and share files over their phones, computers, and personal digital 
assistants while bypassing traditional phone system when user has access to broadband); 
UTStarcom, F1000G Specsheet,  http://www.utstar.com/Document_Library/0554.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2006) (describing UTstar F1000G Wi-Fi mobile handset, which has three-
way calling, call rejecting/redial/mute, call waiting, call transfer, and call forwarding, 
among other services). 
 34 See infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text. 
 35 See Kirsner, supra note 27 (explaining that VoIP “lets workers bring their own phone 
extensions to branch offices and hotel rooms”). 
 36 See MCI, MCI Advantage:  Technical Diagram, http://global.mci.com/us/ 
enterprise/voice/voip/index.xml (last visited Jan. 18, 2006) (trumpeting mobility, 
efficiency, and affordability of VoIP services in comparison to “Old World” circuit-
switched telephony where people needed three or more networks for data and voice 
communication, including data/IP network, long-distance provider, and local call 
provider, and where closed architecture of traditional telephone system foreclosed kind of 
mobility now available with VoIP, and noting that traditional telephone providers charged 
extra for any moves, additions, or changes to existing structure that VoIP providers do not). 
 37 High-speed access to the Internet is often referred to as “broadband,” a term which 
means a “higher-speed transmission of data over an ‘always-on’ connection.”  Enrico C. 
Soriano et al., Internet Developments:  A Look at Key Issues Currently Shaping Broadband 
Deployment and Regulation, in 21ST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY & 
REGULATION 2003, at 177 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop., Course 
Handbook Series No. G0-015D, 2003); see Robert W. Crandall et al., Universal Broadband 
Access:  Implementing President Bush’s Vision, in 22ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY & REGULATION 2004, at 523 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, 
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a. Area Codes No Longer Signal Geographic Locations 
Unlike the traditional telephone system, VoIP area codes are not 
designed to reflect subscribers’ physical locations.  When replacing 
traditional telephones with VoIP, subscribers need not retain local area 
codes on their phone numbers.  This is because VoIP phone numbers 
correspond to the subscribers themselves and to their portable Analog 
Telephone Adapters (“ATAs”),38 not to the location of their residences or 
offices.39  As such, VoIP users may select any available area codes40 for 
their ATAs and purchase additional “virtual” numbers that route calls to 
their ATAs.41  Thus, a VoIP area code has no geographic significance 
with regard to a subscriber’s location. 
Vonage, a cutting-edge VoIP provider, explains that area codes 
provide subscribers with a virtual presence in different states “without 
the substantial overhead.”42  This enables customers or friends sharing a 
subscriber’s area code to call the subscriber cheaply.43  It also helps 
attract customers to businesses.44  For example, a company located in 
 
Trademarks, and Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 3202, 2004). 
 38 An ATA is an analog-to-digital converter that takes the analog signal from a 
traditional phone and converts it to digital data for transmission over the Internet.  Tyson 
& Valdes, supra note 28.  The ATA facilitates the packet-switching at the heart of VoIP 
technology.  Id.  If the recipient of a call uses a traditional telephone, VoIP technology 
reassembles the data packets and converts them back to analog form.  Id.; see Ellen 
Muraskin, Service Touts VoIP Perk — Without the Hardware, EWEEK.COM, Nov. 18, 2004, 
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1729497,00.asp (describing VoIP service offered 
by CallWave that intercepts calls made to subscribers’ existing phone numbers and 
forwards calls over Internet instead of over PSTN). 
 39 See Ellison, supra note 31, at 108. 
 40 Id.; see Vonage, Listing of Available Area Codes Webpage, 
http://www.vonage.com/avail.php (last visited July 18, 2005) (explaining that with 
Vonage, users “are no longer tied to [a] ‘local area code’” and may choose any area code 
from its list).  As Vonage highlights:  “Even if you live in New York, you can have a 
California number.”  Id.; see Randall, supra note 27 (noting that AT&T’s CallVantage 
subscribers can select from up to 39 area codes). 
 41 Ellison, supra note 31, at 108; see Vonage, Virtual Phone Number Webpage, 
http://www.vonage.com/features.php?feature=virtual_phone_number (last visted Jan. 18, 
2006) (describing Vonage’s virtual phone number service). 
 42 Vonage, supra note 41.  Vonage asks consumers to “imagine having business cards 
with New York, London, and Mexico City satellite office numbers” for less than $5.00 per 
month each.  Id. 
 43 Id.; see also Randall, supra note 27 (describing virtual number service offered by 
AT&T’s CallVantage, called Simple Reach Numbers, as giving subscribers second number 
outside their area codes so that callers in those areas covered by second number, such as 
relatives or business partners, can make local phone calls to subscribers). 
 44 Offering customers the opportunity to use local area codes makes it cheaper for 
customers to call businesses outside of their home states, since the customers avoid long-
distance charges in calling them.  See Vonage Launch Underlines Importance of Numbering 
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Durham, North Carolina, may purchase VoIP phone numbers with 
Chicago and Los Angeles area codes in the hopes of generating business 
there.45  That company might also buy another VoIP number with a 212 
area code to ensure its listing in New York City’s Yellow Pages.46  Because 
VoIP area codes are assigned to people and their ATAs, not to locations, 
VoIP technology removes the geographic marker from the 
communications it transmits.  VoIP represents a radical departure from 
the controlled, traditional telephone system where area codes signal the 
location of telephone and fax users. 
b. The Mobility of VoIP 
VoIP’s mobility renders the notion of location-specific 
communications meaningless because VoIP subscribers bring their VoIP 
numbers with them wherever they travel so long as they have access to 
broadband.47  For example, a VoIP subscriber from Texas who plugs her 
ATA into a hotel telephone in Beijing, China, and logs onto the Internet 
can make and receive phone calls in China as if she were at home.48  As 
the CEO of Vonage explains, the “whole basis” of VoIP is “mobility.”49  
But such portability, a critical feature of VoIP technology, precludes VoIP 
providers from ascertaining the precise location of their subscribers.50 
 
Policy, POL’Y TRACKER, Mar. 13, 2005, http://www.policytracker.com/headlines.php 
[hereinafter Vonage Launch]. 
 45 See Ellison, supra note 31, at 108. 
 46 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 166.  However, decoupling telephone numbers from 
geographic regions risks consumer fraud.  See Vonage Launch, supra note 44.  For example, it 
becomes “cheap and easy for a small company to give the false impression that it has 
offices all over the country.”  Id. 
 47 See Vonage, Take Vonage with You Webpage, http://www.vonage.com/ 
features.php?feature=traveling (last visited Jan. 18, 2006) (explaining that Vonage 
subscribers can “[t]ake Vonage wherever [they] go” so long as subscribers have their ATAs 
and broadband Internet connection).  Vonage explains that “[w]hen visiting family, going 
on vacation or traveling for business, [a subscriber] can make and receive calls from one 
convenient Vonage number.”  Id.  Moreover, a Vonage customer using a Wi-Fi handset 
designed by UTStarcom has access to its phone service so long as the subscriber talks in a 
Wi-Fi network.  Wilson Rothman, Over There?  Call for Less, TIME, Apr. 25, 2005, at A3, 
available at http://www.vonage.com/corporate/press_news.php?PR=2005_04_25_0. 
 48 See John C. Dvorak, Free Phone Calls, PC MAG.COM, July 29, 2003, 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,4149,1206172,00.asp.  John Dvorak, a reporter for PC 
Magazine, explained that while traveling to New York from California, he connected his 
ATA to his hotel phone and his laptop and “[v]oilá! A dial tone,” as if he was at home in 
California.  Id.  Dvorak received his home phone calls in his hotel room in New York, 
thousands of miles from his home.  Id. 
 49 See Vonage Launch, supra note 44. 
 50 See FCC Order, supra note 8, at 33.  As the FCC has explained, and as the VoIP 
industry has applauded, portable VoIP services are offered “independent of geography.”  
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The serious problems VoIP providers have had connecting their 
subscribers51 to geographically-appropriate 911 Emergency Response 
Centers or Public Safety Access Points (“PSAPs”) demonstrates the 
inability to ascertain the geographic location of VoIP communications.52  
This is because 911 calls are routed based on the calling number’s area 
code, which accurately reflects a traditional telephone user’s geographic 
location but not a VoIP subscriber’s locale.53  The Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) has attempted to mitigate this 
problem by requiring VoIP providers to connect their subscribers to 
PSAPs covering the geographic areas that the subscribers have reported 
as their locations.54  VoIP providers must notify subscribers that they 
have a duty to inform and to update their VoIP providers about their 
precise locations to ensure the proper routing of 911 calls.55 
The FCC’s Order, however, provides an imperfect solution to the 911 
problem since the proper routing of VoIP 911 calls is not automatic.56  It 
depends on a VoIP subscriber’s vigilant updating of her location 
information with her VoIP provider.57  If a VoIP subscriber travels 
outside of her reported locale and neglects to update her location 
information with her VoIP provider, that subscriber’s 911 calls will not 
 
Id.  Thus, VoIP providers cannot discern their subscribers’ geographic locations.  Id. 
 51 Id. at 15; see, e.g., Carol Wilson, E911 Decision Adds More Fuel to Voice-over-IP Blaze, 
TELEPHONY, May 23, 2005, at 8 (discussing problems raised by FCC’s requirement that VoIP 
providers connect users to appropriate emergency service stations). 
 52 See FCC Order, supra note 8, at 22.  PSAPs differ from 911 Emergency Response 
Centers (“E-911”) in that callers must tell PSAP personnel their location, whereas 
traditional E-911 providers automatically receive location information from traditional 
telephone service providers based on the calling telephone number’s area code.  See 
Vonage, Vonage Provides 911 Webpage, http://www.vonage.com/features.php? 
feature=911 (last visited Jan. 18, 2006). 
 53 See FCC Order, supra note 8, at 15 (explaining that 911 problem stems from inability 
of VoIP providers to “discern from where their customers are accessing the VoIP service” 
given VoIP’s portability). 
 54 See id. at 22.  The FCC Order requires local phone companies to give VoIP providers 
access to their E-911 networks.  Id. 
 55 Id. at 32. 
 56 Id. (noting that it is not “technologically feasible for providers of interconnected 
VoIP services to automatically determine location of their [subscribers] without [their 
subscribers’] active cooperation”). 
 57 Id.  The FCC ruled that VoIP providers must give their subscribers “one or more 
methods of updating [their] information regarding [their] physical location” to ensure that 
VoIP providers always have the most current information about their subscribers’ 
locations.  Id.; see Vonage, supra note 52 (explaining that subscribers who move or travel 
must provide their new location to Vonage through their web account to ensure that their 
911 calls are sent to appropriate PSAPs). 
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be connected to the geographically-appropriate PSAP.58  Because VoIP 
technology does not pinpoint a caller’s location, a fail-safe 911 solution is 
unavailable.59  The 911 problem shows that VoIP technology defies the 
location-identifying norm of the traditional, circuit-switched telephone 
system.  As Part III demonstrates, the borderless nature of VoIP will pose 
serious problems for the modern personal jurisdiction doctrine as well. 
c. VoIP’s Routing Features 
VoIP eliminates the predictability of the location of calls to VoIP 
subscribers in a variety of ways.  VoIP technology, for example, allows 
subscribers to receive calls in multiple locations at once.60  Thus, a VoIP 
subscriber from California, who owns additional residences in Colorado 
and Idaho, can program her VoIP phone number to ring simultaneously 
at both of her vacation homes during a winter trip.61  VoIP also enables 
subscribers to forward their VoIP numbers to multiple phones, resulting 
 
 58 Indeed, VoIP subscribers’ lack of reliable access to PSAPs has been blamed for a 
number of critical injuries and deaths.  See Donny Jackson, Public Safety Gets Its Wish, 
MOBILE RADIO TECH., June 1, 2005, at 6 (describing incident in February 2005 when teen 
could not connect to 911 via her VoIP phone after her parents were shot by intruder, and 
noting another situation in March 2005 when three-month old baby died because her 
mother’s 911 call from her VoIP phone was routed to answering machine).  Thus, a VoIP 
subscriber who tells his VoIP provider that he lives in Arizona may call 911 while on a trip 
to Boston.  However, his 911 call will be routed to a PSAP in Arizona where his VoIP 
provider believes he is located, not where he is hurt and needs help.  See David Pace, 
Internet Phone Companies Must Provide 911 Service, INTELLIGENCER (Wheeling, W. Va.), May 
20, 2005, at 6A. 
 59 See Press Release, Vonage, Vonage Completes Successful “Enhanced 911” Trial for 
VoIP Users with Rhode Island Public Safety (Oct. 14, 2004), available at 
http://www.vonage.com/media/pdf/pr_10_14911intrado_04.pdf (describing innovations 
that permit Vonage to provide Rhode Island’s E-911 services with caller’s location and 
callback number, but that information provided to 911 is only accurate if caller is actually 
in geographic location on file with Vonage).  Cellular providers have only recently 
provided uniform E-911 service to subscribers pursuant to an FCC ruling requiring cellular 
phone providers to do so no later than December 31, 2005.  See 911 Service, 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 
(2004).  Unlike VoIP providers who lack the ability to pinpoint their subscribers’ precise 
geographic locations, cellular companies can locate their customers geographically using 
satellite-based global positioning technologies and by tracking signals from cellular towers.  
Thus, they are able to comply with the FCC’s 911 Order.  See Recent Development, Who 
Knows Where You’ve Been?:  Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal 
Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 308-09 (2004). 
 60 See Ellison, supra note 31, at 110-11 (describing services offered by AT&T’s 
CallVantage and Lingo’s VoIP services). 
 61 See Mark Gibbs, Avoiding the Death of a Thousand Pecks, NETWORK WORLD, June 27, 
2005, at 92, available at http://www.networkworld.com/columnists/2005/ 
062705backspin.html (describing service provided by VoIP provider Vonage that allows its 
subscribers to have incoming calls ring simultaneously or sequentially at different 
designated phone numbers). 
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in endless routing possibilities.62  Thus, telephone calls to VoIP 
subscribers end up in locations callers have no reason to know or 
anticipate, further illustrating the inability to pinpoint the geographic 
location of VoIP communications. 
3. SoIP:  VoIP’s Future 
SoIP,63 the future applications of VoIP, will erase the limitations of 
geography beyond voice and fax communications, revolutionizing the 
way in which people and businesses establish a virtual presence in far-
away locations.  In a movement called “network convergence,”64 Internet 
telephony providers are developing applications that will allow IP-
enabled telephones to receive and send phone calls, faxes, e-mails, data 
files, and high-quality real-time videos.65  This will allow VoIP 
subscribers to talk and swap files simultaneously and to leave voice 
messages along with document attachments.66  Another SoIP in 
development, “unified messaging,” will permit subscribers to receive 
their VoIP communications in the most convenient manner to the VoIP 
user at the time of reception.67 
Not only will VoIP efficiently carry all of our communications, it will 
do so from a single point of contact.  Companies are rapidly developing 
more integrated services known as “fixed mobile convergence” that will 
allow VoIP users to have one device for all of their communications.68  As 
 
 62 See Ellison, supra note 31, at 112. 
 63 FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 166. 
 64 “Network convergence” refers to the goal of integrating data, voice, and video over 
a single network infrastructure, which would improve efficiency, flexibility, and cost 
through a “single infrastructure and cabling plant for data, voice, and video.”  Michael J. 
Vincent, Presence:  The Case for Adopting a Converged Network 3 (Apr. 2005) 
(unpublished whitepaper), available at http://www.ins.com/downloads/whitepapers/ 
ins_wp_converged_network_0405.pdf. 
 65 Dan McLean, e-Insider:  VoIP Pointing Way Toward Complete Convergence, GLOBE & 
MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 28, 2005, at B10 (describing emerging business applications of VoIP 
that allow doctors to collaborate from remote locations through multimedia links). 
 66 Id. 
 67 See Computacenter, Network Convergence 9-10 (Nov. 2003) (unpublished 
whitepaper), available at http://www.cw360ms.com/research/whitepapers/Network%20 
convergence%20white%20paper%20Final.pdf (explaining that unified messaging 
technology allows voice messages to be translated into e-mails while recipient is in meeting 
or, when same person is out in field, retrieves voicemail as e-mail and delivers it to that 
person’s mobile personal digital assistant); see also Kirsner, supra note 27 (explaining that 
when vice president of VoIP innovator Avaya, Jorge Blanco, commutes to work “he listens 
to his unread e-mails, spoken by voice synthesizer, and [to his] unheard voice mails”). 
 68 See Tim Greene, Mobile VoIP Set to Roam Even Wider, NETWORK WORLD, Jan. 17, 2005, 
at 24; see also Mobile Pipeline, Blackberry to Get Enterprise Wireless VoIP, INTERNET WK., June 
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Sanjay Jhawar of BridgePort explains, “fixed-mobile convergence” 
permits highly mobile professionals to bring together their office phone, 
mobile phone, and e-mail addresses to a single point of contact that is 
accessible at all times.69  For example, Avaya and Motorola have 
developed a dual-mode phone, a hybrid device that enables individuals 
to move seamlessly between office Wi-Fi, public wireless hotspots,70 and 
cellular networks.71  Thus, when the emerging SoIP technologies come to 
the market, individuals will conduct their business and personal affairs 
from a single IP-enabled device — sharing and commenting on work 
files, talking to friends, e-mailing business partners,  and faxing 
materials — wherever broadband or wireless hotspots exist without 
regard to their location.72 
 
 
15, 2005, http://www.internetweek.cmp.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=164303433 
(explaining that technology companies Research In Motion and Avaya are working to add 
wireless VoIP capabilities to Research In Motion’s Blackberry device so that consumers can 
communicate more effectively). 
 69 See Jeff Vance, When Wi-Fi Meets Cellular, NETWORK WORLD, Mar. 14, 2005, at 46, 
available at http://www.networkworld.com/techinsider/2005/031405tiwireless3.html. 
 70 Voiceover WiFi refers to VoIP wireless phones and VoIP softphone software on a 
wireless PC.  See Greene, supra note 68, at 24.  Experts project that by the end of 2007 there 
will be a total of about 182,000 hot spots worldwide with over 60,600 of them in the United 
States.  Id.  This development will make use of VoIP wireless phones more likely in the 
future.  Id. 
 71 See Vance, supra note 69, at 46.  The dual-mode phone functions as a VoIP phone in 
the office and, as the user moves out of the office, acts as a cellular phone.  Id.  A wireless 
gateway “manages the handoff between the two networks,” while the IP telephony 
software permits features commonly associated with desk phones, like conferencing.  Id.  
The handset can access data and voice applications on both networks.  Id.  Thus, a “doctor 
starting a phone conversation in the hospital via Wi-Fi could walk out of the building, get 
in a car, and drive away but continue the call because the network flipped it over to a 
cellular network.”  Greene, supra note 68, at 24. 
 72 VoIP and the emerging SoIP innovations enable employees to work virtually from 
“wherever they are — whether at home, the airport, a customer site, or an overseas field 
office.”  Joanne Cummings, Masters of the Virtual World, NETWORK WORLD, Apr. 25, 2005, at 
76, available at http://www.networkworld.com/nw200/2005/042505virtualvendors.html; 
see David Kirkpatrick, Gates and Ozzie:  How to Escape E-mail Hell, FORTUNE, June 27, 2005, at 
169 (discussing how 21st century technologies fundamentally change way we work and 
live).  Microsoft’s Ray Ozzie remarked that: 
Every place you can identify a boundary — from a national boundary, to 
boundaries between federal, state, and local, to boundaries between home and 
work — something is causing it to blur.  We have as an industry traditionally 
built technology to serve those boundaried entities.  What excites me is that we 
can mold technologies into a form that matches the changing nature of business 
and work. 
Id. at 172. 
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VoIP also will play a significant role in our future communications 
given its superior performance in times of national crisis.73  For example, 
a VoIP subscription enabled the Mayor of New Orleans to reach 
President Bush after Hurricane Katrina ravaged the city’s traditional 
telephone lines and cell towers.74  The current efforts in Mississippi and 
Louisiana to restore communication services in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina are relying heavily on wireless services in light of the 
considerable damage to the fiber-optic cable lines of the traditional 
telephone providers.75 
The accessibility of VoIP, coupled with its innovative features, low 
cost, speed, and efficiency,76 will undoubtedly result in VoIP’s 
widespread use in the future.77  Whereas twentieth century individuals 
 
 73 Christopher Rhoads, Cut off:  At Center of Crisis, City Officials Faced Struggle to Keep in 
Touch, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2005, at A1. 
 74 Id. (explaining that New Orleans mayor and his team of city leaders had no way to 
communicate with outside world for two days after Hurricane Katrina hit city, until 
member of mayor’s technology team realized that he had set up Internet phone account 
with Vonage that he could use to connect with outside world once emergency power 
returned to Hyatt hotel where they sought shelter).  On August 31, 2005, the mayor’s team 
made its first outside call in two days and reached President Bush.  Id. 
 75 Dibya Sarkar, Congress Seeks Improved Disaster Communications, FED. COMP. WK., Sept. 
26, 2005, available at http://www.vonage.com/corporate/press_news.php?PR= 
2005_09_26_0 (noting that BellSouth plans to rebuild communications systems in ravaged 
Gulf Coast areas with VoIP and fiber-optic systems); Carol Wilson, Long Road to Recovery 
Begins After Gulf Coast Hurricane, TELEPHONY, Sept. 19, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 
14837178. 
 76 See Kirsner, supra note 27 (explaining that VoIP subscribers using wireless phones 
make and receive calls without airtime costs of cellular phone usage).  Just as VoIP users 
avoid airtime costs for cellular phone usage, VoIP users also avoid the per-call costs of 
long-distance communication in their monthly call packages.  Id.; see also Trope, supra note 
19, at 64 (asserting that because “VoIP service is free from most, if not all, state and federal 
regulation taxes and tariffs” that are imposed on traditional telephony providers, VoIP 
service is usually 10% to 30% less expensive than traditional PSTN service).  According to 
Mike Volpi, Cisco’s Senior Vice President for routing technology, VoIP changes the 
telephony industry from making money from “distance or how long you talk” to doing so 
based upon “value [created] around voice communication.”  FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 
166.  Volpi explained that, in the future, the “voice will be free; it’s what you enable 
customers to do around it that will differentiate companies.”  Id. 
 77 See also Matthew Friedman, VoIP Market Projected to Hit $4 Billion, INTERNET WK., 
July 20, 2005, http://internetweek.cmp.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=166401191 
(explaining that VoIP in North America is “on the brink of a phenomenal growth spurt 
over the next six years” when VoIP revenues will likely reach $4.07 billion, up 1300% from 
$295.1 million in revenues in 2004); cf. Mobile, VoIP Replacing Traditional Voice Service, 
Researcher Says, MOBILE PIPELINE, June 22, 2005, http://www.techbuilder.org/news/ 
164901850 (explaining that analysts predict that by 2010, 60% of households in Western 
Europe will abandon their landlines for VoIP or cellular service).  Compare Trope, supra 
note 19, at 65 (noting predictions by experts that VoIP use could increase from its current 
level to 40% of consumer market by 2008, and arguing that VoIP’s popularity suggests 
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and businesses communicated with far-flung places through a myriad of 
media, including the mail, the traditional telephone, the cellular phone, 
and the computer, individuals in the twenty-first century using VoIP and 
SoIP technologies will radically change that scenario.  In the future, all of 
the ways in which individuals and businesses establish a virtual 
presence outside their home fora — e-mail, voice, fax, file-sharing, and 
real-time video — will increasingly occur over VoIP-enabled devices that 
have no geographic markers. 
Because our national economy is driven largely by the interstate 
connections we establish over modern communication technologies, 
VoIP will increasingly affect commerce.  As a result, litigation and issues 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the twenty-first century will increasingly 
involve VoIP communications.  The next part will consider the 
application of the modern law of personal jurisdiction to borderless 
communications.  As the following sections demonstrate, the profound 
technological changes ushered in by VoIP and SoIP will undermine the 
very premises of the Court’s existing minimum contacts doctrine. 
II. THE TRADITIONALLY HARMONIOUS PRINCIPLES OF TERRITORIAL 
CONTACT AND IMPLIED CONTRACT CLASH IN BORDERLESS  
COMMUNICATION CASES 
The modern minimum contacts doctrine rests on the twin normative 
pillars of state sovereignty, springing from a nonresident’s territorial 
conduct in the state, and implied contract, derived from a nonresident’s 
 
impending restructuring of telecommunications infrastructure of United States), with 
Belson, supra note 25, at A5 (comparing 180 million wire-line users and 173 million 
cellphone users with 1.5 million VoIP subscribers in early 2005).  Former FCC Chairman 
Michael Powell has called VoIP a “killer application,” FCC Chief in VoIP Warning, FIN. 
TIMES LONDON, May 5, 2004, at 28, that will “turn the telephone industry on its head and 
remake it[] into something that consumers are going to find enormously valuable.”  Chris 
Walsh, VoIP Hailed as the Future:  FCC Chairman Predicts Net-Based Calling to Spur Phone 
Industry Revolution, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), May 5, 2004, at 4B. 
  Indeed, providers of traditional telephone services like the regional Bells, long-
distance providers, and cable companies are following the lead of private companies by 
offering VoIP services.  Muraskin, supra note 25; see Belson, supra note 25 (explaining that 
traditional phone companies like Verizon, AT&T, and SBC Communications are 
developing their own Internet-based phone services).  Not surprisingly, however, the 
traditional Bell companies that are tied to their millions of miles of copper phone lines “are 
loath to get into the digital phone market for fear of cannibalizing their core product.”  Id.  
Instead, many Bells are trying to keep customers by packaging their traditional phone lines 
with cheap broadband connections, cellular service, and video programming from satellite 
television providers.  Id. 
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purposeful contact with the forum.78  Concepts of territoriality in the law 
of personal jurisdiction emerged in the nineteenth century when the 
Supreme Court limited state adjudicative power to people and property 
located within a state’s borders.79  The minimum contacts doctrine 
adopted in the middle of the last century80 expanded the notion of 
territoriality justifying a state’s judicial authority to include nonresidents 
who conducted litigation-raising activity in the state.81  A nonresident’s 
constructive presence82 in the state, established by the nonresident’s 
litigation-related local activity, secured the state’s “sovereign power to 
try” nonresidents in its courts.83 
 
 
 78 See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality opinion) 
(Scalia, J.) (explaining that minimum contacts doctrine operates by analogy to concepts of 
presence); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (“[T]he constitutional 
touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in 
the forum state.”). 
 79 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877); Rogers v. Coleman, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 422, 426-
27 (1808). 
 80 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 81 See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 618 (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.) (holding that, following 
International Shoe, “defendant’s litigation-related ‘minimum contacts’” with forum could 
“take the place of physical presence as the basis for jurisdiction”); ESAB Group, Inc. v. 
Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 623 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that minimum contacts 
jurisprudence has developed as “surrogate for [physical] presence in the state because a 
state’s sovereignty remains territorial and its judicial power extends over only those 
persons, property, and activities in its borders”); Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of 
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32 INT’L L. 1167, 1169-70 (1998) (explaining that modern 
articulation of personal jurisdiction doctrine “continued to be tied to [a] place, but [is] 
measured by a more complex relationship with the defendant than simply the location of 
his body”). 
 82 This Article uses the terms “constructive presence,” “territorial contact,” and 
“territorial conduct” to refer to a nonresident’s litigation-raising activity within a state’s 
territory, a critical prerequisite to a state’s exercise of judicial jurisdiction over a 
nonresident under the minimum contacts doctrine.  I invoke the concept of “constructive 
presence” because the Supreme Court, in its adoption of the minimum contacts doctrine in 
International Shoe, relied upon notions of presence in articulating the quality of a 
nonresident’s in-state conduct that would warrant judicial jurisdiction.  See text 
accompanying notes 106-12.  Also, the Supreme Court in its most recent personal 
jurisdiction decision, Burnham, conceptualized the minimum contacts doctrine as one 
developed by analogy to concepts of presence.  See text accompanying note 123.  This 
Article views the terms “constructive presence,” “territorial contact,” and “territorial 
conduct” as useful rhetorical devices to identify a nonresident’s in-state activity, the 
cornerstone of the minimum contacts doctrine.  See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-76.  Others 
might decline to use the term “constructive presence,” preferring “sufficient contacts” or 
the like.  Although legitimate reasons exist to employ different terms to refer to the 
defendant’s in-state, litigation-related activity, this Article conceives the above-mentioned 
terms as useful devices, leaving resolution of any weakness in using them for another day. 
 83 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980). 
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The implied contract theory of the modern personal jurisdiction 
doctrine reflects due process limits on a state’s exercise of its adjudicative 
authority.84  Under that theory, a state’s exercise of its judicial authority 
over a nonresident would be reasonable and hence comport with due 
process if the nonresident purposefully connected with, and implicitly 
subjected herself to, that state’s authority.85  The due process analysis, in 
that regard, reflects an implied agreement between the defendant and 
the forum.86 
In designing the purposefulness inquiry in the mid to late twentieth 
century, the Court appropriately presupposed that telephone technology 
connects individuals in identifiable locations.87  In cases involving 
traditional telephone contacts, the concepts of territorial contact and 
implied contract were in sync because nonresidents purposefully 
connected with particular fora based on the area codes of the telephone 
numbers they called. 
In the fifteen years since the Supreme Court last ruled on personal 
jurisdiction,88 however, communication technologies have changed 
radically.  In the 1990s, cellular phone technology disconnected voice 
communications from fixed locations, allowing individuals to make and 
receive calls outside the geographic regions covered by their phones’ 
area codes.  Thus, the traditionally consonant notions of territorial 
contact and implied contract clashed when a phone number’s area code 
failed to signal the forum a nonresident actually contacted when calling 
a cellular phone user.  In such circumstances, a nonresident could not 
impliedly agree to face jurisdiction in a particular forum, leading some 
courts to find that calls to cellular phone users lacked jurisdictional  
 
 
 
 84 See id. at 297-98. 
 85 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. 
 86 See Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 721 (1987). 
 87 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (holding that given “inescapable fact of modern 
commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire 
communications across state lines,” physical presence within state is not required to justify 
personal jurisdiction so long as defendant “purposefully directed” his actions to forum 
residents). 
 88 In 1990, the Supreme Court addressed the validity of tag jurisdiction.  Burnham v. 
Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990) (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.) (upholding 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendant on grounds that defendant was physically served 
with process while visiting forum state).  But the Court last specifically ruled on the specific 
jurisdiction theory of the minimum contacts doctrine in the 1980s.  See Asahi Metal Indus. 
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. 
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import, no matter the harmful communications such calls transmitted to 
a forum state.89 
A. Twin Pillars:  Territorial Sovereignty and Implied Contract in the Theory 
of Personal Jurisdiction 
This subpart traces the central organizing principles of the law of 
personal jurisdiction:  territoriality and implied contract.  It explores the 
sovereignty concerns underlying the constructive presence inquiry and 
the due process protections provided by the implied contract theory.  
Section 1 shows how territorialist concepts developed in personal 
jurisdiction law and then looks at the significance of a nonresident’s 
territorial conduct in the modern minimum contacts doctrine.  Section 2 
describes the implied contract rationale of the purposefulness inquiry in 
the minimum contacts doctrine. 
1. State Sovereignty:  The Significance of Territoriality in the 
Minimum Contacts Doctrine 
An abiding feature of the law of personal jurisdiction90 is that a 
defendant’s activity within a forum’s borders warrants the exercise of 
that state’s adjudicative authority over the defendant.91  Although 
territoriality concepts appeared in jurisdiction decisions as early as 
 
 89 See infra notes 242-57 (describing jurisdictional rulings involving cellular phone 
contacts). 
 90 Part II focuses on the significance of territoriality, implied contract, and “fair play 
and substantial justice” in the minimum contacts doctrine.  For a comprehensive 
explanation of the evolution of the law of personal jurisdiction, see Robert J. Condlin, 
“Defendant Veto” or “Totality of the Circumstances?”:  It’s Time for the Supreme Court to 
Straighten out the Personal Jurisdiction Standard Once Again, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 53 (2004). 
 91 See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 609, 620 (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.) (finding that personal 
jurisdiction theory adheres to “the principles traditionally followed by American courts in 
marking out the territorial limits of each State’s authority,” using defendant’s activities in 
forum as “substitute” for physical presence); id. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[O]ur 
common understanding now, fortified by a century of judicial practice, is that jurisdiction is 
often a function of geography.”); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 
293 (1980) (“[W]e have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for 
jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate 
federalism embodied in the Constitution.”); see also Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and 
Territory, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1989) (arguing that Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine 
hinges on notions of territorial sovereignty over nonresidents’ acts within its borders); 
Stein, supra note 86, at 689 (explaining that law of personal jurisdiction ultimately addresses 
allocation of sovereign authority); Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal 
Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 377, 404 (1985) (explaining that basic principle of personal 
jurisdiction law is that state’s authority is limited to controlling transactions, things, or 
people connected to its territory). 
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1808,92 the Supreme Court made it clear personal jurisdiction was a 
function of a state’s boundaries in its landmark 1877 Pennoyer v. Neff 
decision.93  The Court decided Pennoyer at a time when individuals 
largely conducted their business affairs locally and rarely traveled 
between states. 94 
In Pennoyer, an Oregon state court asserted jurisdiction over, and 
issued a default judgment against, a nonresident, defendant Neff, where 
the only notice plaintiff provided the defendant was by publication.95  
Neff claimed that the federal court had no obligation to give full faith 
and credit to the state court’s judgment given Oregon’s lack of 
jurisdiction over him.96  Justice Field, writing for the Pennoyer Court, 
agreed.97  The Court ruled that a state’s adjudicatory authority extended 
only to nonresidents physically served in the state’s borders or to 
nonresidents whose in-state property had been attached at the outset of 
the litigation.98  The Court reasoned that because every state possesses 
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within 
its borders, “no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over 
 
 92 See D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1851) (refusing to recognize New York 
judgment against Louisiana resident because, under “well-established rules of international 
law,” New York court abused its power by rendering judgment over Louisiana resident 
who had not been personally served in New York and who owned no property there); 
Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. 481, 485-86 (1813) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (“[J]urisdiction cannot be 
justly exercised by a state over property not within the reach of its process, or over persons 
not owing them allegiance or not subjected to their jurisdiction by being found within their 
limits.”); Rogers v. Coleman, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 422, 426-27 (1808) (explaining that court’s 
jurisdiction attaches when person or property falls within sphere of state’s authority); see 
also Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 273-
74 (1990) (explaining that early history of state court decisions concerning personal 
jurisdiction reveals courts’ concern with issues of interstate sovereignty, reflecting 
competing visions of Federalists and Antifederalists in post-Revolutionary era); Roger H. 
Transgrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 871 
(1989) (explaining that before adoption of Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, Supreme Court 
had developed federal common law rules defining state court’s personal jurisdiction over 
nonresidents based on territorial concepts drawn from principles of public international 
law). 
 93 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877); see Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process 
Clause, and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 570 (1958) 
(explaining that Pennoyer stands as source of modern law of personal jurisdiction). 
 94 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); see MITCHELL, 
supra note 10, at 165-66 (describing that communications in pre-industrial communities 
were largely limited to towns where people lived). 
 95 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877). 
 96 See id. at 721-22. 
 97 Id. at 733. 
 98 Id.  The Court also recognized personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 
who consented to the court’s jurisdiction.  Id. 
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persons or property without its territory.”99 
Pennoyer reflected the territorial conception of jurisdiction in cases like 
D’Arcy v. Ketchum100 that limited state judicial authority to people and 
property within a state’s borders.101  The Pennoyer Court, in dictum,102 
tied these principles to the Fourteenth Amendment, finding that 
proceedings in a court “to determine the personal rights and obligations” 
of parties over whom the court lacks jurisdiction do not “constitute due 
process of law.”103  The Court defined the jurisdictional right protected 
by the Due Process Clause as the individual’s right to be free from 
illegitimate assertions of state authority.104 
The twentieth century’s sea change in transportation and 
communication technologies105 prompted the Court in International Shoe 
 
 99 Id. at 722, 733.  The Court, citing Justice Story’s treatise on the conflict of laws, 
explained that because the several states possess equal authority and the independence of 
one state “implies the exclusion of power from all others,” a state’s exertion of power 
beyond its borders “is a mere nullity” and “incapable of binding such persons or property 
in any other tribunals.”  Id. at 722-23. 
 100 52 U.S. 165 (1851). 
 101 LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 25 (1986). 
 102 The Court’s discussion of the Due Process Clause constituted dictum because the 
Fourteenth Amendment, whose Due Process Clause (unlike that in the Fifth Amendment) 
applied to the states, had not yet been ratified at the time of the state-court judgment 
against Neff.  BRILMAYER, supra note 101, at 25 n.26. 
 103 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733-34 (“As stated by Cooley in his Treatise on Constitutional 
Limitations . . . for any other purpose than to subject the property of a nonresident to valid 
claims against him in the State, ‘due process of law would require appearance or personal 
service before the defendant could be personally bound by any judgment rendered.’”); see 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241, 
258-62 (contending that Justice Story, who based his writing on work of Dutch jurist Huber, 
influenced basic organization and intellectual structure of Court’s decision in Pennoyer); 
Kogan, supra note 92, at 300 (arguing that Justice Field, while influenced by Justice Story’s 
explanation of international sovereignty, “metamorphosed” personal jurisdiction doctrine 
from doctrine of international law to doctrine of personal rights protected by Constitution 
against overreaching of states). 
 104 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733; see Kogan, supra note 92, at 298, 337 (explaining that, in 
Pennoyer, “Justice Field viewed the personal jurisdiction doctrine as one important means 
by which federal courts could police the states with respect to upholding the civil rights of 
American citizens” protected by Reconstruction Amendments). 
 105 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (noting that Court shifted from 
rigid rule of Pennoyer to flexible minimum contacts inquiry to account for technological 
progress of 20th century that “increased the flow of commerce between the States” and 
thus amplified need for jurisdiction over nonresidents); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 
U.S. 220, 222 (1957) (attributing expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in International 
Shoe to great changes in modern transportation and communication in 20th century that 
fundamentally changed national economy). 
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Co. v. Washington106 to expand forum-court jurisdiction beyond people 
and property located in a state’s borders to include nonresidents whose 
forum activities gave rise to the litigation.107  Although geography 
remained the central “organizing principle” in the personal jurisdiction 
analysis,108 International Shoe replaced the strict physical presence 
requirement of Pennoyer with the flexible “minimum contacts” 
approach.109  Under the minimum contacts doctrine, the Court focused 
on whether the “quality and nature” of the defendant’s litigation-related 
activities in the forum warranted the state’s judicial authority.110 
The International Shoe Court began by reaffirming that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects nonresidents from the 
binding judgment of fora lacking jurisdiction over them.111  The Court 
further held, however, that a court could acquire jurisdiction over 
nonresident defendants on the basis of their litigation-raising “contacts, 
ties, or relations” with the forum state.112  Under the minimum contacts 
doctrine, a court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident comports 
with due process so long as the nonresident’s activity in the forum state 
gave rise to the lawsuit and maintenance of the suit would not “offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”113 
With International Shoe, the Court shifted from the strict territorial 
paradigm of Pennoyer to a “neoterritorialist”114 approach based upon the 
“quality” and “nature” of a nonresident’s litigation-related acts in the 
state.115  This shift, however, was a measured one.  In describing the 
activities that would meet or fall short of the “quality and nature” 
inquiry, the Court continued to rely upon the concept of territorial 
 
 106 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 107 Id. at 316. 
 108 Stein, supra note 81, at 1169. 
 109 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17 (holding that jurisdiction would be appropriate under 
minimum contacts approach despite fact that defendant had not been served within state 
and consent to suit could not be implied as Pennoyer approach requires). 
 110 Id. at 319. 
 111 Id. at 316. 
 112 Id. at 319. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Stein, supra note 81, at 1169-70; see Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 
943 (4th Cir. 1994) (following International Shoe, “[a] state’s jurisdictional power remains 
territorial, to be exercised within its boundaries over persons, property and activities 
there”). 
 115 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319  (holding that “Whether due process is satisfied must 
depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity [in the forum] in relation to the 
fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process 
clause to insure.”). 
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“presence.”116  The Court, identifying the type of contact that would 
squarely merit jurisdiction over a nonresident, explained that 
“[p]resence” is not “doubted” where the defendant’s “continuous and 
systematic” activities in the forum “give rise to the liabilities sued on.”117  
Conversely, jurisdiction would offend due process if a nonresident had 
only a “casual presence” in the forum or conducted “single or isolated” 
activities in a state that lacked a connection to the lawsuit.118 
Personal jurisdiction law, to date, finds its principal justification in 
territorialist119 concepts.120  By predicating a state court’s exercise of 
specific jurisdiction121 on a nonresident’s litigation-raising activity in the 
state, the Supreme Court has made clear that the minimum contacts 
doctrine is geographically prescribed.  Justice Scalia, in Burnham v. 
 
 116 Id. at 316-17; see also Kogan, supra note 92, at 351 (arguing that International Shoe 
adopted conceptual structure of Pennoyer by relying on notions of presence but suggested 
that changing times required that concept be more broadly construed than mere physical 
location).  Professor Kogan remarked that International Shoe did not abandon Pennoyer’s 
requirement of presence, but “merely said that the concept must be renovated to suit the 
circumstances of modern society.”  Id. at 352. 
 117 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See BRILMAYER, supra note 101, at 31. 
 120 Courts variously refer to a nonresident defendant’s litigation-raising acts in the 
forum as “affiliating circumstances,” “surrogates for presence,” and conduct establishing a 
“substantial connection” with the forum.  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 
U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (refusing to find jurisdiction over defendants in Oklahoma due to 
absence of any “affiliating circumstances” by defendants with forum to justify state’s 
adjudicatory power over them); ESAB Group., Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 623 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (explaining that “the jurisprudence of minimum contacts has developed as a 
surrogate for presence”); see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 487 (1985) 
(upholding jurisdiction over Michigan defendant in Florida based on his “substantial 
connection” with Florida); see also Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consol. Fiber Glass Prods. 
Co., 75 F.3d 147, 151-52 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that Pennsylvania lacked jurisdiction over 
corporate defendant in breach of contract action where defendant performed no conduct in 
Pennsylvania that warranted state’s exercise of adjudicative authority because defendant’s 
solicitation and negotiations of contract occurred in California, none of defendant’s 
personnel ever visited Pennsylvania, defendant delivered its products to California, and 
only contact defendant had with Pennsylvania constituted informational calls it made to 
plaintiff that had no impact on negotiation or execution of contract); Mesalic v. Fiberfloat 
Corp., 897 F.2d 696, 700-01 (3d Cir. 1990) (upholding personal jurisdiction over defendant 
in New Jersey given defendant’s extensive contact with plaintiff in New Jersey concerning 
contract at heart of the lawsuit, including his sending written correspondence to plaintiff’s 
New Jersey residence, calling plaintiff at his New Jersey residence, delivering boat to 
plaintiff in New Jersey, and coming to New Jersey to repair boat); Beck v. D’Amour, 923 F. 
Supp. 196, 200-02 (D. Utah 1996) (refusing to find jurisdiction over defendant in Utah in 
stock conversion action because tort of conversion and injury occurred in Thailand where 
defendant looted contested funds and because defendant conducted no acts relevant to 
litigation in Utah). 
 121 See supra note 5 (describing specific jurisdiction theory addressed in this Article). 
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Superior Court of California,122 affirmed the abiding significance of territory 
in current personal jurisdiction law by describing the minimum contacts 
doctrine as one “developed by analogy to physical presence.”123 
Professor Lea Brilmayer124 views a nonresident’s litigation-related 
activity within a state as invoking that state’s “territorial sovereignty.”125  
A nonresident’s forum contacts “count”126 and thus justify the exercise of 
judicial jurisdiction because a state has the right to regulate a 
nonresident’s activity within its borders.127  When basing judicial 
 
 122 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.). 
 123 Id. at 618-19 (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.)  (stating, “as International Shoe suggests, 
the defendant’s litigation-related ‘minimum contacts’ may take the place of physical 
presence as the basis for jurisdiction” because “minimum contacts” standard was 
developed as a “substitute” for physical presence requirement of Pennoyer).  As Lesnick 
held: 
[W]hile International Shoe expands upon the notion of “presence” to provide 
flexibility to accommodate the increased flow of commerce between the states, 
the standard for imposing jurisdiction over persons outside the state has 
remained one that depends on a measure of the person’s activity in the state 
coupled with the constraint that the state’s exercise of such power would not 
offend traditional notions of fair play. 
Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 942 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); see 
also Steven R. Greenberger, Justice Scalia’s Due Process Traditionalism Applied to Territorial 
Jurisdiction:  The Illusion of Adjudication Without Judgment, 33 B.C. L. REV. 981, 1025 (1992) 
(remarking that in Burnham plurality, Justice Scalia articulates that “presence is the 
paradigm of all jurisdiction”). 
 124 Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and “Purposeful Availment”:  A Reassessment of 
Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 455, 457 (2004) (“[P]ersonal 
jurisdiction limits are based on a view about the limits of state sovereignty.”); Allan R. 
Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet:  Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of Regulatory 
Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV.  411, 416 (2004) (explaining that “defendant’s individual due 
process right to be free from illegitimate authority is a perfect vehicle to protect state 
sovereignty”); Weisburd, supra note 91, at 383 (arguing that personal jurisdiction law is 
deduced from “general federalism-related territorial limitations on state sovereignty”). 
 125 See Brilmayer, supra note 91, at 28.  Professor Arthur Weisburd persuasively 
analogizes the territorial concepts underlying a state’s judicial authority over nonresidents 
to the territorially driven understanding of a state’s power to tax and to prosecute 
criminals.  Weisburd, supra note 91, at 391-98.  For Professor Weisburd, the due process 
limits on a state’s judicial jurisdiction, tax jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdiction in 
criminal matters all “trace back to the common basic principles that the sovereignty of 
other states limits a state’s authority and that a state’s authority extends only to that which 
affects its territory.”  Id. at 402.  Thus, “[l]ocal presence of at least part of transactions, 
conduct or events is not merely sufficient, but is necessary to permit the state to assert 
[personal] jurisdiction.”  Id. at 404. 
 126 The phraseology “how contacts count” comes from the title of Professor Lea 
Brilmayer’s seminal 1980 article, How Contacts Count:  Due Process Limitations on State Court 
Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77. 
 127 Id. at 87.  Professor Brilmayer explains that “[t]he two bases of jurisdiction — 
unrelated and related contacts — . . . constitute alternative aspects of a State’s sovereignty, 
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jurisdiction on a nonresident’s contacts with the forum, the state “merely 
requir[es] the defendant to bear the costs arising out of [his] occurrences 
in the forum.”128  Under this theory, the minimum contacts doctrine 
expanded a state’s “internal regulatory authority” to include 
nonresidents who conducted litigation-raising activity there.129 
This interpretation finds strong support in World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson.130  In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court held that the 
Due Process Clause limits a state’s sovereign adjudicative powers and 
that such limits cannot be satisfied by showing that it would not be 
inconvenient for the nonresident to defend itself in the forum.131  The 
Court explained that because due process restrictions “are a consequence 
of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States,” the Due 
Process Clause “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a 
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with 
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.”132  For the World-Wide 
Volkswagen Court, a nonresident’s minimum contacts implicated the 
 
namely, self governance and territoriality.”  Id.  On the one hand, a defendant’s systematic 
unrelated activity in a state, like being domiciled, being incorporated, or doing business in 
a state, suggests that the person or corporate entity is “enough of an ‘insider’” so that he 
may safely be relegated to the state’s political processes.  Id.  On the other hand, jurisdiction 
based on a defendant’s litigation-raising activity in the forum stems from a “regulatory and 
territorial justification.”  Id.  Under that theory, the state uses the defendant’s in-state 
conduct to gauge whether such conduct warrants state judicial regulation.  Id. at 88; see also 
Stein, supra note 86, at 761 (explaining that jurisdictional rules define “when and how a 
state may command obedience from an individual”). 
 128 Brilmayer, supra note 126, at 87. 
 129 Stein, supra note 86, at 696 (contending that, since Pennoyer, Court has expanded 
jurisdiction from strict territorialism to recognizing acts that warrant state’s adjudicative 
authority based on relationship formed by individual with state).  The minimum contacts 
doctrine signaled that the sphere of a state’s legitimate authority “must be determined by 
subtler standards than the defendant’s current location” as required by Pennoyer.  Id. at 710. 
 130 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980). 
 131 Id.  The Court explained that even though the “progress in communications and 
transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome,” the 
trend in technology does not herald the demise of all restrictions on the personal 
jurisdiction of state courts because such restrictions are “more than a guarantee of 
immunity” from inconvenient litigation.”  Id. 
 132 Id.  Professor Wendy Purdue describes World-Wide Volkswagen as reflecting two 
critical points:  “[F]irst, that personal jurisdiction limits are based on a view about the limits 
of state sovereignty; and second, that purposeful availment is the correct measure of state 
sovereignty within our federal system.”  Perdue, supra note 124, at 457.  Professor Perdue 
argues, and this Article agrees, that “[i]t is important to differentiate between these two 
propositions because one can readily accept the first while rejecting the second.”  Id.; see 
infra Part III.C (arguing that purposefulness and its implied contract approach can be 
eliminated from personal jurisdiction law and other means provided to ensure that state’s 
exercise of its judicial authority is reasonable). 
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sovereign state’s “right to regulate activities” 133 within its borders.134  The 
Court reasoned that the “Framers . . . intended that the States retain 
many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the 
sovereign power to try causes in their courts.”135  As the Court explained:  
“[T]he reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over the defendant must 
be assessed ‘in the context of our federal system of government.’”136 
The question of whether state sovereignty remained an essential 
feature of personal jurisdiction was notably implicated in Insurance Corp. 
of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee.137  There, Justice White, 
writing for the majority, found that the defendant had waived his 
personal jurisdiction defense by failing to respond to court-ordered 
discovery on the issue.138  The Court, in its decision, considered the 
defendant’s argument that the due process rights implicated by the 
personal jurisdiction doctrine were akin to Article III’s guarantees with 
regard to subject-matter jurisdiction that could not be waived.139  The 
Court found the defendant’s argument unavailing:  whereas subject-
matter jurisdiction exclusively concerns a federal court’s power to hear a 
case regardless of a litigant’s interests, restrictions on “state sovereign 
power” in personal jurisdiction matters stem from an “individual’s 
liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause” that an individual 
may waive.140  With this reasoning, the Insurance Corp. majority made 
clear that the right to resist unconstitutional assertions of personal 
jurisdiction rests with the individual, not the states vis-à-vis each other. 
Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, however, warned that the 
Insurance Corp. majority had suggested a sweeping revision of the 
 
 133 See Brilmayer, supra note 126, at 85 (arguing that World-Wide Volkswagen illustrates 
“regulatory and territorial justification” of minimum contacts doctrine); Stein, supra note 
124, at 412 (“[The] individual liberty interest of defendants protected by [World-Wide 
Volkswagen] is ultimately measured by whether a state is acting within its legitimate sphere 
of sovereign authority.”); Weisburd, supra note 91, at 405 (exploring how World-Wide 
Volkswagen supports view that personal jurisdiction law stems from “limits on state 
sovereignty inherent in the United States governmental structure”). 
 134 Lea Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process and Political Theory, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 293, 
294-96 (1987) (explaining that adjudicative jurisdiction fundamentally concerns state’s right 
to exercise coercive power over individual or dispute); Perdue, supra note 124, at 457. 
 135 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294. 
 136 Id. at 293-94.  The Court explained that “we have never accepted the proposition that 
state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to 
the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution.”  Id. at 293. 
 137 456 U.S. 694, 695, 702-03 (1982). 
 138 Id. at 703-04. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 702, 703 n.10. 
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modern personal jurisdiction doctrine by replacing the minimum 
contacts requirement with an exclusive focus on “abstract notions of fair 
play.”141  The majority disagreed.142  Justice White, relying on World-Wide 
Volkswagen,143 responded that “[c]ontrary to the suggestion of Justice 
Powell, our holding does not alter the requirement that there be 
‘minimum contacts’ between the nonresident defendant and the forum 
state.”144  The majority instead explained that the World-Wide Volkswagen 
principle that personal jurisdiction reflects the “character of state 
sovereignty” is “ultimately . . . a function” of a nonresident’s due process 
rights and thus can be waived by the nonresident.145  For that reason, 
minimum contacts “can be established when a defendant fails to comply 
with court-ordered discovery” on the contested issue of personal 
jurisdiction.146 
Justice White’s majority decision did not eliminate a sovereign state’s 
judicial authority over a nonresident’s acts within its borders.  Rather, it 
held that the due process protections afforded nonresidents by the 
minimum contacts doctrine belong to those nonresidents and are 
waiveable by them.147  Thus, the sovereignty theory underlying personal 
jurisdiction law remained intact after Insurance Corp. — whether a state’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident exceeded the state’s 
judicial authority.148  Insurance Corp. simply clarified that the right to 
 
 141 Id. at 710, 714 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 142 Id. at 703 n.10. 
 143 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).  Professor 
Weisburd persuasively argues that Insurance Corp.’s reliance on World-Wide Volkswagen 
undermines any suggestion that Insurance Corp. implied that personal jurisdiction law no 
longer concerns “territorial sovereignty.”  Weisburd, supra note 91, at 412-13.  For Professor 
Weisburd, if the Court meant to eliminate state sovereignty from the personal jurisdiction 
calculus, “one would expect its footnote to characterize the World-Wide [Volkswagen] 
rationale as incorrect” since World-Wide Volkswagen held that sovereignty concerns compel 
the minimum contacts inquiry.  Id. at 413.  Because Insurance Corp. reaffirmed the World-
Wide Volkswagen minimum contacts test, Insurance Corp. cannot be read to sever sovereignty 
considerations from the minimum contacts doctrine.  Id. 
 144 Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 703 n.10. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Perdue, supra note 124, at 458 (rejecting suggestion that Insurance Corp. undermined 
notion that “personal jurisdiction is doctrine that allocates sovereignty”); Stein, supra note 
86, at 712 (arguing that Insurance Corp. did not disturb Court’s approach on how to measure 
legitimacy of state’s exercise of judicial authority under minimum contacts doctrine and 
regulatory theory underlying contacts inquiry, but instead found that right to resist 
unauthorized jurisdiction rests with individual, not states); Weisburd, supra note 91, at 415 
(arguing that Insurance Corp. did not say that personal jurisdiction does not flow from 
sovereignty limitations but rather that “once [the court] has gone through process of 
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resist a state’s unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction belongs to 
individuals, not to the states.149 
Supreme Court decisions following Insurance Corp. affirm the 
sovereignty theory underlying the territorial contact inquiry of the 
minimum contacts doctrine.150  In Burger King v. Rudzewicz,151 the Court, 
describing the significance of a defendant’s purposeful forum contacts, 
explained that “parties who ‘reach out beyond one state and create 
continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state’ 
are subject to regulation and sanction in the other state for the 
consequences of their activities.”152  Territorial sovereignty thus remains 
a central feature of the personal jurisdiction doctrine.153 
State sovereignty principles similarly animate the Supreme Court’s 
rulings on the constitutionality of state punitive damages awards under 
the Due Process Clause.154  Notions of territorial sovereignty prominently 
appeared in BMW v. Gore.155  There, the Court explained that a state may 
award punitive damages if such awards advance the state’s legitimate 
interest in punishing and deterring unlawful conduct.156  State punitive 
damages awards, however, would offend due process and its protection 
against “arbitrariness” if such “award[s] can fairly be categorized as 
‘grossly excessive’ in relation to [a state’s] interests.”157  For the Court, 
 
determining the limitations that sovereignty imposes on personal jurisdiction, the rules that 
one deduces remain merely personal rights, waiveable by the persons involved”).  But see 
Robert H. Abrams & Paul R. Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Control of 
State Court Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REV. 75, 81, 83-86 (1984) (describing Ins. Corp. as critical 
departure from “previous articulations of due process requirements” concerning 
significance of state sovereignty). 
 149 Stein, supra note 124, at 415. 
 150 See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990) (plurality 
opinion) (Scalia, J.) (finding that current minimum contacts doctrine permits defendant’s 
“litigation-related ‘minimum contacts’ to take the place of physical presence” as basis for 
state’s jurisdictional authority over defendant); id. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[The] 
state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who is present within its 
territory unless the individual’s relationship to the state is so attenuated as to make the 
exercise of jurisdiction unreasonable.” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 151 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 152 Id. at 473 (quoting Traveler’s Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950)); see 
also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984) (“[I]t is beyond dispute that 
[a state] has a significant interest in redressing injuries that actually occur within the 
State.”). 
 153 Busch v. Buchman, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 154 State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-18 (2003); BMW of 
N.A. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-73 (1996). 
 155 BMW, 517 U.S. at 572-73. 
 156 Id. at 568. 
 157 Id. (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 456 (1993).  
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“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional 
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the 
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of 
the penalty that a State may impose.”158 
The Court tied the due process “excessiveness inquiry” to the 
territorial limitations on state sovereignty.159  The Court explained that an 
award’s “excessiveness” depends upon the “state interests” served by 
the punitive award.160  Analogizing the scope of a state’s authority to 
award punitive damages to a state’s power to tax, the Court explained 
that “no single State . . . [can] impose its own policy choice[s] on 
neighboring States.”161  The Court held that “principles of state 
sovereignty and comity” suggest that a “State may not impose economic 
sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the 
tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States.”162 
In 2003, the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell163 
Court considered whether a Utah jury’s $145 million punitive damages 
award offended the due process rights of a defendant insurance 
company accused of fraud.164  At trial, the plaintiff presented evidence of 
the defendant’s deceptive practices in Utah and across the United 
States.165  The Court held that the Utah jury should have been instructed 
that it could not punish the defendant for its out-of-state conduct 
because Utah “does not have the power” to punish the defendant for its 
actions that had no impact on Utah or its residents.166  The Court 
reasoned that in considering out-of-state conduct to support its punitive 
damages award, the jury offended “a basic principle of federalism . . . 
that each State may make its own reasoned judgment about what 
 
 158 Id. at 574. 
 159 Id.  The Court, in assessing the severity of the penalty a state may impose, relied on 
three guideposts:  (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, (2) the 
disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff, and (3) the 
difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in 
comparable cases.  Id. at 574-75.  The Court’s three-part inquiry ensured that the defendant 
had “adequate notice” of the penalty it would face.  Id.  In so finding, the Court analogized 
the constitutional safeguards afforded to defendants facing civil penalties to the 
“judgments without notice” due process protections in the personal jurisdiction analysis.  
Id. at 575 n.22 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 160 BMW, 517 U.S. at 568. 
 161 Id. at 571. 
 162 Id. at 572. 
 163 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 164 Id. at 412. 
 165 Id. at 420. 
 166 Id. at 422. 
  
2006] Minimum Contacts in a Borderless World 1515 
conduct is permitted or proscribed within its borders, and each State 
alone can determine what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a 
defendant who acts within its jurisdiction.”167 
The Court’s sovereignty theory in its punitive damages decisions 
mirrors the rationale animating the territorial contact inquiry of the 
minimum contacts doctrine.168  Just as Campbell recognized that a state 
may punish a defendant’s conduct within its territorial borders, personal 
jurisdiction law upholds a state’s judicial authority over a nonresident’s 
in-forum activity.169  According to Professor Michael P. Allen, the Court’s 
“strong territorialist” and interstate federalism approach in Campbell 
suggests that the Court’s future personal jurisdiction decisions will 
emphasize state sovereignty as its underlying rationale.170 
The minimum contacts doctrine recognizes a state’s judicial authority 
over nonresidents who established their constructive presence in that 
state, an approach resembling each state’s authority to award punitive 
damages based on a defendant’s activity within its borders.  The next 
section addresses how the Due Process Clause limits a state’s exercise of 
its judicial jurisdiction to nonresidents who purposefully connect with a 
state and thus impliedly agree to face litigation there.  The Supreme 
Court relies on a nonresident’s implied intent in order to assess the 
reasonableness of a state’s exercise of its authority over that resident. 
 
 167 Id. 
 168 Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages, and State Sovereignty, 13 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1, 60-63 (2005) (analogizing sovereignty-based rationale of punitive 
damages decisions of BMW and Campbell to territorial model underlying personal 
jurisdiction doctrine); James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial 
Jurisdiction:  Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 238 n.266 (2004) (“Like 
personal jurisdiction doctrine, the emerging doctrine limiting punitive damage awards has 
a distinct interstate federalism flavor to it.”). 
 169 In comparing the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine to its punitive 
damages decisions, this Article acknowledges that issues concerning punitive damages 
reflect tort reform concerns, among other issues, that the personal jurisdiction doctrine 
does not.  This Article simply points to the Court’s punitive damages decisions as an 
illustration of other areas that reflect the territorial limits of state authority in a due process 
analysis. 
 170 Allen, supra note 168, at 63.  In his discussion, Professor Allen recognizes that 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence has “at its roots a strong notion of state sovereignty.”  
Id. at 61.  He notes that the Court greatly limited interstate federalism and sovereignty as 
“driving jurisdictional forces.”  Id. at 62.  Although this Article disagrees with Professor 
Allen on this point, see text accompanying notes 137-53, it agrees that Campbell makes it 
more likely that the Court will craft its future personal jurisdiction decisions “with an eye 
more directly focused on state sovereignty.”  Id. at 63. 
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2. Due Process Limits:  The Implied Contract Theory in Modern 
Personal Jurisdiction Law 
The Due Process Clause, “acting as an instrument of interstate 
federalism, may sometimes divest the State of its power”171 to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over nonresidents despite their territorial conduct 
in the state because the nonresidents never purposefully172 connected 
with that state.173  Purposefulness is satisfied where nonresidents 
deliberately directed “some act” 174 to the forum such that they could 
have “reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court” there.175  The 
purposefulness inquiry protects nonresidents from facing lawsuits in 
jurisdictions based on a third party’s acts176 or the nonresidents’ 
“accidental” or “attenuated” contacts with the state.177 
The Court designed the purposefulness requirement to ensure that the 
state’s exercise of its judicial authority would be reasonable “in the 
 
 171 World-Wide Volkswagen v.Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980). 
 172 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“[I]t is essential in each case that there 
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State . . . .”). 
 173 Id. 
 174 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 n.18 (1985).  A defendant’s single 
act related to the forum may not be sufficient to establish jurisdiction if it is not reasonably 
foreseeable that the defendant would be haled into the forum’s courts based on that act.  Id. 
 175 Id. (explaining that Due Process Clause may not be used as shield to “avoid 
interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed”); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 
U.S. at 297.  Purposefulness can also be demonstrated by placing products in the stream of 
commerce or by committing an intentional tort like defamation or libel, where the 
defendant targeted the plaintiff who the defendant knows lives and works in the forum.  
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 104 (1987); see Calder v. Jones, 465 
U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984) (upholding California court’s personal jurisdiction over writer and 
editor, who worked for National Enquirer in Florida, in lawsuit alleging defendants libeled 
actress plaintiff in magazine article because defendants “expressly aimed [their article] at 
California,” defendants knew that plaintiff lived and worked in California, and National 
Enquirer had its largest circulation in California such that defendants could “reasonably 
anticipate” being haled into court in there).  Under the Calder “effects” test, defendants 
illustrate a purposeful connection with a forum state by their intentional conduct in the 
forum state that is “calculated to cause injury” there.  Id. at 791.  The Calder Court described 
the purposefulness test as satisfied by a defendant who expressly aimed his tortious actions 
at a particular forum to harm the plaintiff there.  Id. at 789.  The Court has variously 
referred to purposefulness as voluntary or deliberate behavior aimed at the forum. 
 176 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (holding that unilateral activity of third person cannot be 
imputed to defendant in purposefulness analysis). 
 177 This “ensures that a defendant’s amenability to jurisdiction is not based on 
fortuitous contacts,” but on the defendant’s “real relationship with the state with respect to 
the transaction at issue.”  Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 
780 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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context of our federal system of government.”178  This means that the 
nonresident must have had “fair warning” about where her conduct 
would render her liable to a lawsuit179 and the opportunity to “structure 
[her] primary conduct” to “alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation” 
by “procuring insurance” or by “severing [her] connection” to the 
state.180  The purposefulness inquiry, in turn, promotes the “orderly 
administration of the laws” by “giv[ing] a degree of predictability to the 
legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary 
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will 
and will not render them liable to suit.”181  Thus, a state may reasonably 
exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who purposefully 
connect with the forum because those nonresidents chose to enjoy the 
benefits of conducting activities in the state, including the right to resort 
to the forum’s courts, and thus assumed the concomitant “obligation” to 
respond to lawsuits “aris[ing] out of” or “connected with” their conduct 
there.182 
The Court’s articulation of the purposefulness inquiry suggests that a 
forum court’s sovereign authority over nonresidents stems from an 
implicit agreement between the nonresidents and the forum.183  For 
 
 178 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292-93 (finding that Due Process Clause serves 
two different functions in personal jurisdiction arena:  (1) securing “fairness” embodied in 
“fair play and substantial justice” factors, and (2) ensuring “reasonableness of asserting 
jurisdiction over the defendant . . . ‘in the context of our federal system of government’” by 
requiring that claims in lawsuit arise from or relate to nonresident’s purposeful, litigation-
raising activity in state (quoting Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)); 
Brilmayer, supra note 126, at 85 (arguing that “the sovereignty concept inherent in the Due 
Process Clause is not the reasonableness of the burden [borne by the defendant] but the 
reasonableness of the particular State’s imposing it.”).  Professor Brilmayer notes that the 
Supreme Court measures the reasonableness of the state’s exercise of its regulatory 
authority by asking whether the defendant was “responsible for those [in-forum] 
occurrences.”  Id. at 89.  So interpreted, the “Due Process Clause seems to require that the 
person who would suffer the deprivation have some contact with the State by which he has 
subjected himself to its power.”  Id.;   see also Stein, supra note 86, at 711 (“Due process 
protects the sovereign interests of other states, but only incidentally, through its protection 
of the individual from illegitimate assertions of state authority.  Legitimacy, though, is 
defined by reference to the state’s allocated authority within the federal system.”).  For 
Professor Stein, an individual’s due process rights “inescapably are linked to the allocation 
of sovereign authority.”  Id. at 706. 
 179 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472-74. 
 180 Id. 
 181 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
 182 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475-76. 
 183 See Brilmayer, supra note 91, at 1 (asserting that minimum contacts doctrine 
embodies theory of contract law by incorporating exchange of promise analysis). 
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example, in World-Wide Volkswagen,184 the plaintiffs, while living in New 
York, bought an Audi automobile from the defendant Seaway, an Audi 
dealership located in New York.185  As the plaintiffs drove through 
Oklahoma, their car caught fire after another automobile hit them.186  The 
plaintiffs brought a products liability suit against the defendants Seaway 
and World-Wide Volkswagen, the Northeast regional car dealership, in 
Oklahoma state court.187  The Court found that Oklahoma lacked 
jurisdiction over the defendants because they did not deliberately seek 
out the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law:  they did not sell cars 
there, solicit business there, or attempt to serve the Oklahoma market in 
any way.188 
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court defined the judicial jurisdictional 
reach of a state in contractual terms189 by focusing on whether the 
nonresidents actually or impliedly agreed to enjoy Oklahoma’s laws in 
exchange for their obligation to defend a lawsuit that arose from their 
activities there.190  The World-Wide Volkswagen finding that the defendants 
 
 184 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286. 
 185 Id. at 288. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 295. 
 189 Id.  Although contracts can be established either expressly or impliedly by parties, 
express and implied contracts do not differ in their legal effect, as the only difference lies in 
the respective obligor’s method of manifesting assent.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 4, cmt. a (1981).  The purposefulness inquiry evolves from the tenets of 
implied contract, as the assent given by both the forum and an out-of-state resident is a 
legal fiction.  See Brilmayer, supra note 91, at 19-20.  An implied contract exists when the 
courts infer the obligor’s assent based on the obligor’s conduct or other nonverbal evidence 
of consent.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra, § 4, cmt. a (describing 
elements required to satisfy implied contract).  As the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
explains, the assent or “consideration” necessary to create a valid contract revolves around 
an exchange of promises or performances.  Id. § 71(1).  In an implied contract, the 
contracting parties are presumed to “bargain” for this exchange and to return promises or 
performances predicated on that bargain.  Id. § 71(2); 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §§ 1.1, 2.4 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that contract is only valid if 
parties bargained for exchange).  What matters is “not what is bargained for” but “that each 
person’s promise or performance is induced by the other’s.”  Randy E. Barnett, A Consent 
Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV.  269, 287 (1986) (emphasis added).  The bargained-for 
exchange rationale allows for “private planning and to prevent the weight of legal coercion 
from falling upon those informal or ‘social’ arrangements where the parties have not 
contemplated legal sanctions for breach.”  Id. at 289; cf. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM 
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 106-07 (2d ed. 1998) (explaining different theories of justice in 
contractual terms by asking whether contract was agreed to and if it was fair). 
 190 See Stein, supra note 86, at 690 (noting that contractual justification has predominated 
Court’s decisions for past 40 years with World-Wide Volkswagen as primary example of view 
that state’s regulatory sphere for jurisdictional purposes rests on consensual, contractual 
arrangement between defendant and forum state).  Several court decisions reflect the 
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had not deliberately sought out the benefits of Oklahoma law to justify 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over them suggests that purposefulness 
requires a “meeting of the minds” 191 between the defendants and the 
forum.  With its contract justification, the minimum contacts doctrine 
aims to ensure that a nonresident defendant impliedly agreed to the 
forum state’s judicial jurisdiction.192 
A state court’s assertion of specific jurisdiction over a nonresident 
depends on a nonresident’s constructive presence in the state and that 
nonresident’s implied agreement that, in exchange for the opportunity to 
 
notions of implied contract in the minimum contacts doctrine.  See Heritage House Rests., 
Inc. v. Cont’l Funding Group, Inc., 906 F.2d 276, 282-83 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that 
defendant purposefully availed himself of protections and benefits of Illinois law when he 
made misrepresentations at heart of lawsuit during phone calls and in letter that he 
directed to plaintiff in Illinois); Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendant physician in Texas in medical malpractice lawsuit 
because defendant purposefully conducted activities in Texas by shipping drugs to plaintiff 
from California to Texas on three occasions and by calling plaintiff’s physician in Texas to 
monitor plaintiff’s condition, thereby invoking benefits of Texas law and accepting burden 
of facing suit there); Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc. v. G & G Auto Sales, Inc., 512 So.2d 1334, 
1336 (Ala. 1987) (upholding jurisdiction over nonresident car seller in Alabama where 
defendant purposefully directed its marketing efforts to residents of Alabama and thus 
availed itself of privilege of making sales to, and profits from, Alabama residents, thus, 
requiring defendant to “bear the burden commensurate with the benefits [it] received from 
its sales in Alabama”); Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 
(Tex. 2005) (“Jurisdiction is premised on notions of implied consent — that by invoking the 
benefits and protections of a forum’s laws, a nonresident consents to suit there.”). 
 191 Stein, supra note 86, at 721.  Professor Stein has argued that with Shaffer v. Heitner, 
433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Court made clear that the contract justification of the 
purposefulness inquiry was not merely based on notions of a fair exchange of benefits for 
burdens, a quasi-contractual notion, but required a “truly consensual meeting of the 
minds” to support extraterritorial jurisdiction.  Stein, supra note 86, at 721.  In Shaffer, a 
Delaware court asserted jurisdiction over the directors of a Delaware corporation in a 
shareholder derivative action based on the plaintiff’s attachment of the defendant directors’ 
shares that, under Delaware law, were deemed to be located in Delaware.  433 U.S. at 214.  
The plaintiff claimed that, in attaching the defendants’ property in the state, Delaware 
obtained quasi in rem jurisdiction over the defendants who, aside from serving as directors 
in a company incorporated in Delaware, had no connection with the forum.  Id.  The Court 
held that Delaware lacked jurisdiction over the defendants because their contacts with the 
state did not put them on notice that Delaware would require them to answer for their 
behavior there since all of the alleged malfeasance at the heart of the shareholder litigation 
occurred outside of Delaware.  Id. at 216 (“It strains reason . . . to suggest that anyone 
buying securities in a corporation formed in Delaware impliedly consents to subject 
himself” to Delaware’s jurisdiction. (internal quotation marks omitted)).  This language 
suggests that the purposefulness inquiry involves notions of implied contract where the 
parties knowingly exchange benefits and burdens. 
 192 See Stein, supra note 86, at 721 (arguing that Court, in focusing jurisdictional inquiry 
on “how the defendant and [the] forum state have consensually ordered their 
relationship,” has effectively privatized due process concerns underlying law of personal 
jurisdiction). 
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enjoy a state’s laws, she will submit to its courts’ authority.  The 
constructive presence and purposefulness inquiries aim to ensure that 
the state court’s exercise of its authority over the nonresident will be 
reasonable and hence comport with due process.  The following section 
describes the additional due process protections of “fair play and justice” 
in the minimum contacts inquiry.  These protections examine the fairness 
of the state’s exercise of jurisdiction based on the prospective impact the 
lawsuit would have on the parties, the court system, and the several 
states.193 
3. Additional Due Process Limits:  “Fair Play and Substantial 
Justice” Concerns 
Under the minimum contacts doctrine, due process also requires that a 
state’s exercise of judicial jurisdiction over a nonresident comports with 
“fair play and substantial justice.”194  To that end, the Court assesses the 
burden shouldered by the nonresidents in defending themselves in the 
forum state,195 the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,196 the 
 
 193 See Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts:  Toward a Mixed 
Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 193-94, 207 (1998) (describing considerations 
of defendant’s conduct and mental state in minimum contacts doctrine as “reflect[ing] a 
retrospective, i.e., ex post, viewpoint that looks back from the initiation of the lawsuit” and 
that “fair play and substantial justice” concerns of judicial efficiency, parties’ convenience, 
and states’ shared interests “reflect a prospective, i.e., ex ante, viewpoint that looks forward 
from initiation of the lawsuit”). 
 194 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen, 
444 U.S. at 292. 
 195 See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (plurality 
opinion) (O’Connor, J.) (“The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in 
a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of 
stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.”).  In Asahi, eight 
Justices agreed that the California court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the Japanese 
defendant would be unreasonable given the distance the defendant would have to travel to 
litigate the case and the difficulty defendant would face in submitting its dispute with the 
Taiwanese company to a “foreign nation’s judicial system.”  Id.  Of all of the 
“reasonableness” factors, the defendant’s inconvenience is “always a primary concern.”  
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 210 
(1st Cir. 1994) (explaining that California defendant’s burden of having to litigate case in 
Massachusetts is “entitled to substantial weight in calibrating the jurisdictional scales”).  
The inconvenience factor weighs heavily in the jurisdictional balance of the reasonableness 
factors because it provides a mechanism through which “courts may guard against 
harassment.” Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 211. 
 196 The “forum’s adjudicatory interest” inquiry assesses the forum’s interest in the 
litigation without comparing the forum’s interest in the matter to other jurisdictions’ 
interest in the case.  See, e.g., Chaiken v. VV Publ’g Corp., 119 F.3d 1018, 1029 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(finding that Massachusetts had no interest in hearing lawsuit about injured reputation of 
plaintiff who lived in Israel); Sawtelle v. Ferrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1395 (1st Cir. 1995); Mesalic v. 
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plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,197 the 
interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient 
resolution of controversies,198 and the common interest of all of the 
sovereign states in furthering substantive social policies.199  Courts 
should decline to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents if these 
“fair play and substantial justice” factors overwhelmingly suggest that 
the exercise of jurisdiction would be unfair.200 
 
Fiberfloat Corp., 897 F.2d 696, 701 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that New Jersey had strong 
interest in protecting its residents from out-of-state manufacturers who commited torts or 
breached contracts with its residents). 
 197 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (“When minimum contacts have been established, often the 
interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the 
serious burdens placed on the alien defendant.”).  The Second and Ninth Circuits have 
suggested that they accord plaintiff’s inconvenience little weight.  See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 574 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding plaintiff’s choice of 
forum irrelevant to jurisdiction inquiry); Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 
1490 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Neither the Supreme Court nor our court has given much weight to 
inconvenience to the plaintiff.”). 
 198 See, e.g., Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 619, 631 (5th Cir. 1999) (assessing 
efficiency concerns, courts look at judicial system’s interest in adjudicating individual 
claims against multiple defendants in single litigation); OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. 
Co., 149 F.3d 1086, 1097 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding jurisdiction inappropriate and forum 
inefficient because insurance litigation would be governed by Canadian law); Robertson-
Ceco, 84 F.3d at 574 (finding Vermont inefficient forum for litigation because plaintiff did 
not live in Vermont and witnesses and evidence were located outside of Vermont). 
 199 Courts have identified the following issues as advancing the collective interests of 
the sister states:  a state’s ability to provide a convenient forum for its residents to redress 
injuries by nonresidents from far-flung places who connect with forum residents in “our 
age of advanced telecommunications,” Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1395; the foreign policy interests 
that arise when pursuing a case against a foreign national defendant, Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115, 
Wortham v. Karstadtquelle AG (In re Nazi Era Cases), 320 F. Supp. 2d 204, 231 (D.N.J. 2004); 
the enforcement of securities regulations, see, for example, Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 
F.3d 361, 372 (3d Cir. 2002); and the “widely shared interest in preserving citizens’ 
willingness to talk openly with the press,” see, for example, Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 211. 
 200 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (finding that California state court improperly exercised 
jurisdiction over Taiwanese valve manufacturer, even if defendant purposefully availed 
itself of California market, given California’s lack of interest in Japanese company’s 
impleader action against Taiwanese defendant, high burden California litigation would 
impose on Taiwanese defendant, Japanese plaintiff’s slight interest in trying case in 
California, and international diplomacy concerns implicated in case that counseled against 
exercise of jurisdiction); id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (“I do agree, however, with the Court’s 
conclusion in Part II-B that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Asahi in this case 
would not comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice” . . . .  This is one of those rare 
cases in which “minimum requirements inherent in the concept of ‘fair play and substantial 
justice’ . . . defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has 
purposefully engaged in forum activities.”).  The Court, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
noted that a weaker showing of a defendant’s purposeful contact with the forum could 
support forum-court jurisdiction where “fair play and substantial justice” strongly 
supported jurisdiction.  471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985).  Professor Stein argues that the 
Supreme Court’s Asahi decision marked a retreat from this view.  Stein, supra note 124, at 
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The “fair play and substantial justice” concerns maintain an ex post 
view of due process201 by examining the prospective impact the litigation 
will have on the parties, the court system, and the states.202  The 
purposefulness requirement and its due process protections, in contrast, 
measure the reasonableness of the state’s exercise of its adjudicative 
authority based on the nonresident’s territorial conduct.  To that end, the 
purposefulness inquiry assumes an ex ante perspective, focusing on the 
nonresident’s past acts — her in-state conduct that gave rise to the 
litigation — that implicate the forum state’s sovereignty. 
The next subpart addresses how, in determining the reasonableness of 
the state’s exercise of its judicial authority, the principles of constructive 
presence and purposefulness seemingly operate in harmony in cases 
arising from traditional telephone contacts.  Those principles, however, 
tear apart when applied to borderless cellular phone communications. 
B. The Purposefulness Inquiry Presumes that Telephones Direct 
Communications to Single, Identifiable Locations 
The Court designed the current minimum contacts doctrine at a time 
when individuals directed circuit-switched telephone communications to 
known geographic locations.  As a result, the notions of territorial 
contact and a defendant’s purposeful connection with a particular place 
almost always ran together.  That remains true in today’s traditional 
telephone system used by 180 million U.S. residents.203  Communications 
 
426.  He explains that Asahi suggested that while the “reasonableness” concerns could 
divest a forum of jurisdiction, those factors could not compensate for a low level of 
purposefulness.  Id. 
 201 McMunigal, supra note 193, at 194; Stein, supra note 124, at 427.  Professor James 
Weinstein observes that the “fair play and substantial justice” considerations protect 
interests beyond the individual liberty of nonresident defendants.  Weinstein, supra note 
168, at 227-31.  He explains that the forum state’s interest in the litigation, the interstate 
judicial system’s interest in efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared policy 
interests of the several states protect interstate federalism concerns.  Id. at 228 n.233.  The 
consideration of the “plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief,” Weinstein 
observes, stems from “a common law rule of interstate venue by which the Supreme Court 
has attempted to allocate judicial power among the states efficiently and fairly.”  Id. at 229.  
So, too, does the “efficient resolution of controversies” interest implicate interstate venue 
considerations. 
 202 Kogan, supra, note 92, at 358-59 (explaining Supreme Court’s current minimum 
contacts doctrine as wavering between two different approaches — interstate sovereignty 
and fairness to litigants and court system). 
 203 See supra notes 17-20; see also Condlin, supra note 90, at 132-33 (explaining that 
technology used in pre-Internet world to “extend one’s reach into other states — the 
telephone, automobile, railroad, airplane, and the like — could be pointed in single 
directions, so to speak”). 
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over the PSTN cross state lines in predictable directions made clear by a 
telephone or fax number’s area code.204  The Supreme Court’s decisions, 
and those of the lower federal and state courts, reflect the presumption 
that home and office telephones connect individuals in specific 
geographic locations.205 
In Burger King,206 the defendant, a resident of Michigan, entered into a 
franchise agreement with Burger King, a Florida corporation, through its 
Michigan representatives for the operation of a Burger King restaurant in 
Michigan.207  The franchise agreement obligated the defendant and his 
partner to pay Burger King over $1 million dollars during a twenty-year 
period.208  Although the defendant dealt with Burger King’s district office 
in Michigan, he also negotiated directly with the company’s 
headquarters in Miami, Florida.209  The defendant contacted Burger 
King’s headquarters by mail and by telephone to resolve disputes over 
building design, site-development fees, rent computation, and defaulted 
payments.210  When the negotiations failed, Burger King sued the 
defendant and his partner in federal district court in Florida for their 
alleged breach of the franchise agreement and trademark infringement.211 
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, held that given the “inescapable 
fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is 
transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines,” 
the defendant’s physical presence in Florida was not necessary for 
jurisdiction212 so long as he “purposely directed” his efforts toward 
residents of that state.213  Guided by these principles, the Court found 
that the defendant purposely connected with Florida by mailing letters 
and placing phone calls to Burger King’s Miami office to negotiate the 
terms of the franchise agreement out of which the lawsuit arose.214  The 
Court also based its finding that the defendant deliberately affiliated 
himself with Florida on the length and substantiality of the commercial 
 
 204 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. 
 205 See infra notes 206-38 and accompanying text. 
 206 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 207 Id. at 466. 
 208 Id. at 467. 
 209 Id. at 467 n.7. 
 210 Id. at 467 n.7, 468 n.9, 481. 
 211 Id. at 468. 
 212 Id. at 476.  The Court noted that although “territorial presence frequently will 
enhance a potential defendant’s affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable 
foreseeability of suit there,” physical presence in the state is not required.  Id. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. at 481. 
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relationship between the parties, the amount of money that regularly 
flowed between Michigan and Florida related to the agreement, and the 
choice-of-law clause in the franchise agreement.215  The Court upheld the 
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant in Florida based on the 
defendant’s purposeful affiliation with the state and the fair play and 
substantial justice concerns.216 
In Burger King, the Court viewed the defendant’s telephone calls and 
letters as functional equivalents, reflecting the traditional assumption 
that telephone calls, like mail, are routed to single, identifiable locations.  
The Court’s presumption made sense because given the circuit-switched 
telephone technology of the time, phone calls to businesses “across state 
lines”217 reliably began and ended in known fora.  The Burger King Court 
thus appropriately framed the minimum contacts inquiry around an 
individual’s purposeful connection with a forum, since area codes of the 
circuit-switched telephone system clearly indicated the location of phone 
calls made and satisfied the fair warning objective of the purposefulness 
inquiry. 
Lower federal and state courts218 presume that nonresident telephone 
callers purposefully direct communications to particular fora based on 
the area codes of the telephone numbers they call.219  For example, in 
Launer v. Buena Vista Winery, Inc.,220 the defendants, a California winery 
and its parent company, hired the plaintiff, a New Jersey resident, to 
work as its sales agent in the New York area.221  During the plaintiff’s 
 
 215 Id. at 481, 487. 
 216 Id. at 487. 
 217 Id. at 476. 
 218 Opinions decided before Burger King, in assessing the purposefulness of a 
defendant’s actions, presumed that a defendant making telephone calls avails himself of a 
forum based on the telephone numbers he dialed.  See, e.g., Brown v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 
688 F.2d 328, 334 (5th Cir. 1982) (upholding Mississippi court’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over Indiana resident based on defendant’s defamatory long-distance 
telephone call to Office of United States Attorney in Oxford, Mississippi, because defendant 
initiated phone call and committed intentional tort during his conversation with 
Mississippi attorney); Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 256 N.E.2d 506, 508 (N.Y. 
1970) (finding that California defendant’s telephone call to New York auction house to bid 
on paintings during live art auction effectively “projected” defendant into plaintiff’s New 
York auction room, thereby signaling defendant’s purposeful engagement of activity in 
New York and justifying jurisdiction over him there). 
 219 See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech. Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 466-67 (D. Mass. 
1997) (distinguishing website from telephone and fax calls because telephone, mail, and 
telex are “singularly” directed to state based on letter’s address or “telephone or fax 
number with a [particular] area code”). 
 220 916 F. Supp. 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 221 Id. at 206. 
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employment, the defendants faxed a memorandum with allegedly 
discriminatory remarks to the plaintiff at his office.222  Following his 
dismissal, the plaintiff sued the defendants for religious discrimination 
under Title VII in federal district court in New York.223 
The defendants moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that New 
York lacked jurisdiction over them, arguing that they never knew that 
plaintiff had an office there and, thus, they never purposefully connected 
with New York with regard to the alleged discrimination.224  In response, 
the plaintiff produced evidence that the defendants faxed the 
discriminatory memorandum to his office telephone, which had a 718 
area code — the area code covering the Brooklyn and Queens region of 
New York.225  The plaintiff also presented proof that the defendants 
frequently called him at his 718 office telephone number.226 
Launer held that New York had jurisdiction over the defendants.227  
The district court, applying New York’s long-arm statute, held that, by 
faxing and by calling the plaintiff at his 718 office telephone number, the 
defendants purposefully “transacted business” there that gave rise to the 
lawsuit.228  The court ruled that those calls and faxes illustrated that the 
defendants deliberately availed themselves of New York law and that 
the exercise of jurisdiction over them comported with fair play and 
substantial justice.229 
Similarly, in Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt,230 the plaintiff, an aircraft 
leasing company, sued the defendant, an attorney living in Germany, for 
fraud, breach of contract, and misrepresentation in federal district court 
in Texas.231  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant called the plaintiff’s 
employee at her home and office phones in Texas to discuss his 
representation of the plaintiff.232  During those phone calls, the defendant 
allegedly made fraudulent promises that gave rise to the lawsuit.233 
The defendant argued that his communications with the plaintiff’s 
employee in Texas were insufficient to support a finding of minimum 
 
 222 Id. at 209. 
 223 Id. at 206. 
 224 Id. at 206-07. 
 225 Id. at 207. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. at 209-11. 
 228 Id. at 209. 
 229 Id. at 210. 
 230 195 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 231 Id. at 211. 
 232 Id. at 212. 
 233 Id. 
  
1526 University of California, Davis [Vol. 39:1481 
contacts since it was fortuitous that the plaintiff’s employee lived in 
Texas.234  The district court firmly rejected the defendant’s argument.235  
The court found that the defendant purposefully availed himself of 
Texas by calling Texas telephone numbers because those calls gave rise 
to the alleged fraud at the heart of the lawsuit.236  The court found the 
defendant’s argument about the fortuitous nature of the employee’s 
Texas location specious since it suggested that the defendant “could mail 
a bomb to a person in Texas but claim Texas had no jurisdiction because 
it was fortuitous that the victim’s zip code was in Texas.”237  The court 
upheld jurisdiction over the defendant in Texas, relying on the 
defendant’s deliberate telephone calls to Texas phone numbers as proof 
of his “purposeful availment” of Texas and its laws and on the “fair play 
and substantial justice” factors that supported the exercise of 
jurisdiction.238 
Launer and Wien assumed that the area codes of the telephone 
numbers called by the defendants signaled the recipients’ geographic 
locations and thus the states with which the defendants affiliated 
themselves.239  Similarly, Burger King relied on the plaintiff’s telephone 
 
 234 Id. at 212-13. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. at 215. 
 237 Id. at 213. 
 238 Neal v. Janssen, 270 F.3d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding personal jurisdiction over 
foreign nonresident defendant in Tennessee appropriate based on phone calls and faxes 
that defendant directed to plaintiffs in Tennessee because phone calls and faxes formed 
basis of fraud action and illustrated defendant’s purposeful direction of his 
communications to Tennessee); Wien Air Ala., 195 F.3d at 213, 215; Hafen v. Strebeck, 338 F. 
Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (D. Utah 2004) (exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendant because defendant “knew when he made the alleged misrepresentations [over 
the telephone] to Hafen in Utah that he was directing his conduct to a specific person in the 
state” and because defendant’s misrepresentations during telephone calls formed basis of 
plaintiff’s complaint); Long v. Grafton Executive Search, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1089 (N.D. 
Tex. 2003) (finding specific jurisdiction over defendant in Texas based on defendant’s 
“purposeful” telephone calls and e-mails to Texas employment agency in which defendant 
allegedly defamed plaintiff and tortiously interfered with her prospective business 
relations); Brian Jackson & Co. v. Eximias Pharm. Corp., 248 F. Supp. 2d 31, 36, 37 n.6  
(D.R.I. 2003) (exercising specific jurisdiction over nonresident defendant, start-up 
pharmaceutical company in Pennsylvania, based on defendant’s telephone calls and faxes 
over “ordinary telephone lines” to plaintiff’s Rhode Island phone number because those 
telephone calls gave rise to contract litigation); Roland v. Margi Sys. Inc., 1:00-CV-00341, 
2001 WL 241792, at *1-3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2001) (exercising personal jurisdiction over 
California defendant in New York federal district court in employment discrimination suit 
because defendant regularly contacted plaintiff at her Buffalo, New York area telephone 
number in course of her work and, thus, defendant should have anticipated being haled 
into court in New York for claims arising out of such conduct). 
 239 Wien Air Ala., 195 F.3d at 213-15; Launer v. Buena Vista Winery, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 
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number as the geographic marker of the defendant’s actions in Florida.240  
Burger King and its progeny reveal that the purposefulness standard is 
built on the assumption that nonresident defendants deliberately direct 
telephone communications to identifiable locations.  Thus, as presumed 
by Burger King and explicitly articulated in Launer, a telephone number’s 
area code provides nonresidents with fair warning about the location of 
their actions, thereby allowing courts to find that those nonresidents 
deliberately availed themselves of particular fora.241  As the next subpart 
demonstrates, this presumption fails in a world where communication 
technologies do not accurately identify the locations of telephone calls, 
resulting in a clash between the territorial contact and implied contract 
principles at the heart of the minimum contacts doctrine. 
C. Cellular Phone Cases:  Struggling to Apply the Minimum Contacts 
Doctrine to Borderless Communications 
Cases addressing the jurisdictional significance of cellular phone 
communications demonstrate a fundamental dissonance between the 
territorial contact and implied contract requirements of the minimum 
contacts doctrine.  Because cellular phones are mobile and can be 
answered in unpredictable locations, nonresidents lack warning about 
the states they actually contact when calling cellular phones.242  Thus, a 
nonresident’s calls to a cellular phone user can inflict harm within a 
state’s borders, implicating traditional state jurisdictional sovereignty, 
without a nonresident knowing she contacted that state. 
Courts that have dealt with litigation arising out of cellular phone 
contacts have weighed the implied contract theory prong more heavily, 
denying states jurisdiction over nonresidents because purposeful 
availment was absent.243  Consider as an illustration Denver Truck and 
Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Design and Building Services, Inc.244  There, the plaintiff, 
a South Dakota company, hired the defendant, a remodeling company in 
Colorado, to replace the floor in the plaintiff’s Colorado showroom.245  
After the plaintiff refused to pay for the work, the defendant’s attorney 
called the plaintiff’s president on his cellular phone, which had a South 
 
204, 209-10 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 240 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 480-81 (1985). 
 241 Id.; Launer, 916 F. Supp. at 207, 209. 
 242 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 243 See, e.g., Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 791 (Tex. 
2005). 
 244 653 N.W.2d 88, 92 (S.D. 2002). 
 245 Id. at 90. 
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Dakota area code, and threatened to file a lien on the plaintiff’s 
property.246  The South Dakota court refused to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant based on the attorney’s phone call to the 
South Dakota phone number that gave rise to the business tort claim.247  
Although the defendant knew that the plaintiff’s company had a South 
Dakota office, the district court ruled that because “it was a cellular 
phone,” the defendant’s attorney “had no idea where [plaintiff’s 
president] actually was at the time of the call.”248 
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of Texas in Michiana Easy Livin’ 
Country, Inc. v. Holten249 recently refused to uphold personal jurisdiction 
over an Indiana business that allegedly made misrepresentations to a 
Texas resident over the telephone.250  There, the plaintiff, a Texan 
resident, called the defendant from his Texas telephone number to 
discuss purchasing a custom motor home from the defendant.251  The 
plaintiff bought the vehicle and had it shipped to his home in Texas.252  
The plaintiff sued the defendant in Texas, alleging that the defendant 
defrauded him over the telephone.253 
The court held that recent changes in telephone technology made 
reliance on telephone calls “obsolete as proof of purposeful availment.”254  
The court reasoned that: 
While the ubiquity of “caller ID” may allow nonresidents to know a 
caller’s telephone number, that number no longer necessarily 
indicates anything about the caller’s location.  If jurisdiction can be 
based on phone conversations “directed at” a forum, how does a 
defendant avail itself of any jurisdiction when it can never know  
 
 246 Id. at 92. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id.  Although cellular phone contacts have only been addressed in a limited number 
of cases, those decisions implicitly follow the Denver Truck notion that cellular phone 
contacts lack jurisdictional significance due to the geography-defying nature of cellular 
phones.  See, e.g., Burrows Paper Corp. v. R.G. Eng’g, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 379, 387 
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) (refusing to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant in 
breach of contract action even though defendant’s agent, using his cellular phone, talked to 
plaintiff while agent was physically in New York because it was “mere fortuity” that 
defendant’s agent was actually in New York since his mobile phone had Virginia area 
code). 
 249 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005). 
 250 Id. at 791-92. 
 251 Id. at 781. 
 252 Id. at 781, 784. 
 253 Id. at 784. 
 254 Id. at 791. 
  
2006] Minimum Contacts in a Borderless World 1529 
where the other party has forwarded calls or traveled with a mobile 
phone?255 
Michiana established a bright-line rule that all telephone contacts, as a 
categorical matter, lack constitutional significance under the minimum 
contacts doctrine due to the geography-defying nature of twenty-first 
century telephone communications.256  The Michiana court excluded all 
telephone communications from the minimum contacts analysis, 
including, but not limited to cellular phone calls.257 
The Michiana and Denver Truck courts held the implied contract theory 
indispensable to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and that the 
absence of “fair warning” required by the purposefulness inquiry 
trumped state sovereignty concerns.  Those courts presumably did so to 
protect the nonresident defendants from extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
unexpected fora.  In so finding, the courts destroyed the jurisdictional 
significance of such contacts and, with it, the states’ sovereign authority 
over nonresidents’ harmful communications transmitted to their 
territories.  Such an approach erroneously eliminates state sovereign 
authority over harmful borderless communications sent to a state’s 
territory in the name of a nonresident’s implied agreement with the state.  
As the following part will show, purposefulness is not essential to 
ensuring that a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident is 
reasonable. 
III. REBUILDING PERSONAL JURISDICTION THEORY FOR A               
BORDERLESS WORLD 
In personal jurisdiction litigation arising from borderless 
communications, the emphasis on either territorial contact or implied 
contract yields very different results.  The Court inevitably has to decide 
which of these constitutes the primary operating principle of the 
minimum contacts doctrine.  Subpart A argues that state sovereignty 
values underlying the territorial contact inquiry deserve primacy over 
the theory of implied contract.  Giving the implied contract theory 
preeminence in the minimum contacts doctrine risks destroying a 
sovereign state’s extraterritorial adjudicative authority over 
nonresidents’ harmful communications.258  Sovereignty principles are too 
 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Although no court has yet addressed VoIP in the context of personal jurisdiction, 
courts undoubtedly will face this issue in the near future as VoIP becomes the primary 
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central to a healthy federalism to be sacrificed in the name of honoring a 
fictional agreement between a nonresident and a forum state where a 
nonresident’s due process rights can otherwise be secured. 
Subpart B contends that considerations of sound judicial 
administration support the elimination of the purposefulness 
requirement.  By favoring territorial contact over purposefulness, courts 
avoid satellite litigation concerning a defendant’s intent in transmitting 
calls to VoIP users whose area codes do not reflect their geographic 
location.  Moreover, using the territorial contact inquiry to protect state 
sovereignty concerns harmonizes the Court’s seemingly contradictory 
trends of decentralization, as exemplified by judicial federalism, and 
centralization, as exemplified by cases defining and protecting a concept 
of national citizenship.  It does so by recognizing that state courts have 
developed such competence that nonresidents’ interest in avoiding a 
particular state’s courts is insufficient to justify the impediments to 
interstate commerce that would result from preserving nonresidents’ 
ability to avoid litigating in particular fora. 
Subpart C proposes a solution for protecting nonresidents from 
unreasonable exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction once provided by 
the implied contract theory.  Under this solution, the reasonableness of a 
state’s exercise of its judicial authority would hinge on the state’s 
regulatory interest in the nonresident’s territorial conduct.  To that end, 
only the objective impact of the nonresident’s local activity would be 
relevant.  Where a state has a strong interest in the nonresident’s 
litigation-related territorial activity, the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
nonresident would be reasonable.  If, on the other hand, the state has a 
weak interest in the nonresident’s conduct, the state’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over the nonresident would not comport with due process.  
Without relying on the artifice of an implied contract, such a standard 
will secure state adjudicative authority over harmful communications 
transmitted to a state’s borders and protect a nonresident defendant 
from a state’s unreasonable exercise of jurisdiction. 
A. The Twin Pillars Applied to VoIP Communications:  The Threat to 
Extraterritorial Personal Jurisdiction and a Return to Pennoyer 
If the Court clings to purposefulness and its implied contract rationale 
in VoIP jurisdiction cases, the theories of implied contract and territorial 
contact will inevitably collide.  To illustrate this clash of principles, 
 
mode of our virtual communications as technology analysts predict.  See supra note 77 and 
accompanying text. 
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consider this hypothetical:  Corporation A (“A”), a VoIP subscriber, 
operates a consulting business in Chicago that maintains Illinois, 
Michigan, and New York phone numbers.  Corporation B (“B”), another 
VoIP subscriber, operates a business in Philadelphia.  B uses telephone 
numbers with Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York area codes. 
B’s president sees an online listing for A’s consulting business in the 
New York Yellow Pages.  B’s president calls A’s New York number and 
hires A to provide advice on a project.  A’s employees contact B at its 
New York number.  Employees of A and B communicate over the 
telephone and by fax.  A’s employee sends a fax with critical, misleading 
information to B’s New York number.  Representatives of A also convey 
false information to B’s president over the telephone.  B relies on those 
misrepresentations and suffers significant damages. 
B wants to sue A for fraud in Pennsylavania where it received A’s fax 
and telephone calls.  Under the implied contract theory in current 
personal jurisdiction law, B cannot sue A in Pennsylvania since A’s 
employees never knew they called Pennsylvania.  The number A dialed 
in contacting B did not have a Pennsylvania area code.  Thus, A never 
bargained to receive protection from, and subject itself to, the laws of 
Pennsylvania.  Because B’s telephone number warned A that it could be 
sued in New York, not Pennsylvania, a Pennsylvania court would lack 
jurisdiction over the fraud claim if the minimum contacts doctrine 
requires purposeful availment. 
On the other hand, the territoriality component of the minimum 
contacts doctrine will prevent B from suing A in New York as well.  A 
can successfully oppose personal jurisdiction in New York because 
nothing actually happened in New York that would warrant a New York 
court’s adjudicative authority.  Thus, if both territorial contact and 
implied contract remain essential components of the minimum contacts 
doctrine, personal jurisdiction over A would be inappropriate in 
Pennsylvania, where primary litigation-arising activities occurred, and in 
New York, where A’s employees believed they contacted B.  B could sue 
in A’s home state of Illinois, but may find it costly and inconvenient to 
litigate its case in Illinois. 
Limiting B to suing A only in the state where A can be found reinstates 
the formalistic regime of Pennoyer v. Neff.259  In borderless communication 
cases, requiring purposefulness effectively destroys six decades of extra-
territorial personal jurisdiction.260  Such evisceration of extraterritorial 
 
 259 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). 
 260 Scholars have urged courts to jettison the purposefulness inquiry in cases involving 
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adjudicative jurisdiction undermines the Supreme Court’s principal 
purpose in designing the minimum contacts doctrine:  to expand the 
state court judicial authority over nonresidents’ in-forum, litigation-
raising activities.261  It also contravenes Burger King’s262 explicit 
recognition that telephone communications create meaningful ties with 
states that may warrant state adjudicative authority. 
Such a return to Pennoyer would establish a broad and troubling 
immunity from extraterritorial jurisdiction for nonresident defendants 
who commit torts, discriminate, and breach contracts over borderless 
communications.  Because VoIP promises even more communication 
and commerce across state lines than the technologies that prompted the 
Court to abandon Pennoyer in International Shoe,263 a de facto return to the 
nineteenth century theory of personal jurisdiction is untenable.  This 
cries out for a reformulation of the minimum contacts doctrine.264 
A choice between the territorial contact and implied contract rationales 
of the minimum contacts doctrine is unavoidable.  Some may argue that 
concerns about the jurisdictional problems posed by VoIP are overstated.  
They will likely assert that area codes of phone numbers will still 
correspond to telephone users’ actual locations most of the time and, 
thus, the territorial contact and implied contract theories will continue to 
yield the same result. 
That argument fails.  First, preserving the implied contract theory 
inevitably results in the broad rule articulated in Michiana Easy Livin’ 
 
Internet website activities because the inquiry unnecessarily usurps state adjudicative 
authority.  See Joel Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951, 
1955 (2005) (suggesting that defendants who argue that contacts via Internet are not 
directed at forum state challenge “very ability of sovereign states to protect their citizens 
within their borders from online threats”); Stein, supra note 124, at 412 (arguing that 
because unintended extraterritorial consequences of Internet conduct like website 
marketing and defamation in chat room fall outside adjudicative authority of affected 
states, purposefulness inquiry deprives states of their sovereign authority).  This argument 
is even more compelling in VoIP-contact cases where nonresidents direct voice, fax, and 
data communications to individuals in a particular forum, albeit without knowing the 
recipient’s precise location, whereas Internet websites welcome visitors but never 
affirmatively direct their conduct to potential plaintiffs.  Thus, a stronger argument exists 
for protecting a sovereign state’s judicial authority over calls directed to VoIP users in its 
territory than web marketers who post information and await visitors. 
 261 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 262 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 480-81 (1985). 
 263 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17. 
 264 The Court, addressing concepts of due process, explained that “to hold that a 
characteristic is essential to due process of law [because it has been the law of the land] 
would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress 
or improvement.”  Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1884). 
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Country, Inc. v. Holten 265 that all telephone contacts, traditional or 
otherwise, lack jurisdictional significance due to the borderless nature of 
twenty-first century communications.  This is because callers cannot 
ascertain if they are dialing a traditional or VoIP number and thus do not 
know if they reach a particular location by dialing a specific area code.  It 
also ignores the Denver Truck and Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Design and Building 
Services, Inc.,266 finding that a strict reading of the implied contract theory 
negates the jurisdictional import of all mobile communications, 
including VoIP. 
Second, the problem of personal jurisdiction in a borderless world will 
only deepen with the projected adoption of VoIP telephony for U.S. 
businesses and individuals in the future.267  Because VoIP and cellular 
phones will ultimately transmit so much of our remote communications 
across state lines, interstate commerce and litigation concerning it will 
increasingly arise from borderless communications.268  As a result, the 
clashing jurisdictional principles of territorial contact and implied 
contract will arise with greater frequency, forcing plaintiffs to pursue 
lawsuits in defendants’ home states.  This clash cannot long be ignored. 
As the next sections illustrate, judicial efficiency and rhetoric in legal 
theory also support finding the state sovereignty concerns paramount.  
Moreover, the reasonableness of the state’s exercise of its sovereign 
authority can be determined without sacrificing the state’s judicial 
authority over harmful communications received in its territory, a risk 
that clinging to the purposefulness inquiry would cause. 
B. Privileging State Sovereignty Promotes Efficient Litigation and Notions of 
Judicial Federalism and National Citizenship 
This subpart explores the practical support for securing state judicial 
authority by eliminating the purposefulness requirement when applying 
the minimum contacts doctrine to borderless communications.  Section 1 
identifies the judicial inefficiency engendered by the purposefulness 
requirement.  Section 2 identifies parallels with some of the normative 
theories that arise in discussions of judicial federalism and of national 
 
 265 168 S.W.3d 777, 791 (Tex. 2005) 
 266 653 N.W.2d 88, 92 (S.D. 2002). 
 267 See supra note 77 (describing analysts’ predictions that up to 40% of U.S. consumers 
and businesses will trade their landlines for VoIP by 2008). 
 268 See supra notes 38-72 (discussing borderless nature of VoIP and SoIP).  While this 
argument certainly has merit as to cellular phones that maintain area codes intended to 
reflect each subscriber’s location at the time she purchased the cellular phone, this is not 
true for the area codes of VoIP phones. 
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citizenship.  It finds that this is a rare situation where the Court’s 
centrifugal impulse to elevate state courts’ role and its centripal efforts to 
remove parochial obstructions to interstate commerce coalesce to 
support the primacy of the territorial contact pillar of the minimum 
contacts doctrine. 
1. The Purposefulness Inquiry Will Generate Satellite Litigation 
Elevating territorial contact over purposefulness and its implied 
contract rationale serves judicial economy.  The purposefulness inquiry 
will entangle the courts in unnecessary satellite litigation to divine a 
defendant’s actual intentions in placing a call to a VoIP subscriber.  
Courts routinely permit discovery and hold evidentiary hearings on 
personal jurisdiction contests addressing a defendant’s purposeful 
connection with a forum.269  Litigants, and thus the courts, will inevitably 
engage in extensive fact-findings and hearings about whether 
nonresident callers purposefully contacted particular fora when calling 
VoIP subscribers. 
Indeed, one can envision countless factual issues that defendants will 
raise, including allegations of trickery where VoIP area codes differ from 
subscribers’ actual geographic locations and disputes concerning what 
phone-call recipients with VoIP numbers told nonresident defendants 
about their locations.  Litigation turning on this type of subjective 
inquiry is bound to congest the courts.  Eliminating the purposefulness 
inquiry in VoIP cases, and the satellite litigation that it will entail, will 
result in a more expeditious and cost-efficient resolution of jurisdictional 
litigation. 
 
 
 
 269 Courts generally refuse to dismiss a case on personal jurisdiction grounds without 
permitting the plaintiff to obtain discovery on the issue.  See, e.g., Androutsos v. Fairfax 
Hosp., 323 Md. 634, 640 (1991); Makopoulos v. Walt Disney World, Inc., 535 A.2d 26 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (remanding case for discovery in personal jurisdiction contest to 
uncover evidence concerning purposefulness of defendant’s activities); cf. Purdue Research 
Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that plaintiff 
must establish personal jurisdiction over defendant by preponderance of evidence when 
evidentiary hearings are held by district court); LAK, Inc. v. Deer Creek Enters., 885 F.2d 
1293, 1304 n.7 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that personal jurisdiction issues are decided on their 
own facts and involve time and effort of courts and litigants); In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 81 
F. Supp. 2d 75, 82-83 (D.D.C. 2000) (ordering discovery in personal jurisdiction contest). 
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2. Constructive Presence Brings Together Some Otherwise Disparate 
Values Animating Judicial Federalism and National Citizenship 
Viewing a nonresident’s constructive presence as the primary 
principle of personal jurisdiction law would recognize a forum state’s 
ability to hear claims against nonresidents while honoring relationships 
individuals sustain with states outside their own.  This approach 
reconciles the seemingly inapposite rhetoric deployed in support of  
judicial federalism, on the one hand, and national citizenship, on the 
other.  With regard to the former, the Supreme Court has suggested that 
state courts be afforded greater respect as full partners in the federal 
system.270  Although this typically has arisen in the context of 
determining whether federal or state courts should decide a dispute, a 
crucial underlying issue in those cases is the competence and 
trustworthiness of state courts.271  To that end, the Court has paved a 
decentralized path, placing heavy burdens on those questioning the 
adequacy of state courts.272 
 
 270 The Court’s insistence that state courts deserve respect underlies its abstention 
doctrine.  See, e.g., Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981) 
(barring 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim to remedy unconstitutional administration of state tax 
system because issues of state regulatory laws are more properly heard in state courts); 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971) (holding that federal courts must abstain from 
interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings unless extraordinary circumstances 
show “great and immediate” threat of irreparable harm to give proper respect to state 
courts); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (finding that federal 
courts should refrain from exercising their authority because of “scrupulous regard for the 
rightful independence of the state” courts).  Professor Martin Redish described the 
federalism principles embodied in Younger as “[t]he desire to avoid affronting state judges 
by questioning their competence” and to “prevent federal interference with the orderly 
operation of the state judicial process.”  MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:  
TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 298 (1980).  Another illustration of this 
notion is the Court’s refusal to find federal due process issues where recourse to state 
courts applying state tort law is available on the ground that state court resolution is fair 
and sufficient.  See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (finding that 
Constitution “does not purport to supplant traditional tort law” already administered by 
states). 
 271 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 322-25, 1269 (5th ed. 1996) (exploring Court’s recognition that 
state courts are trustworthy and competent, reflecting parity of state and federal courts); 
Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. 
L. REV. 441, 461 (1963) (arguing that because state courts are competent to find facts and 
decide law, including matters of federal law, scope of habeas review should be narrow); 
Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
605, 625, 630 (1981) (arguing that state courts are as fair and as competent as federal courts, 
and noting that state courts should be treated as partners rather than as servants). 
 272 See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law:  A 
Critique of the Supreme Court’s Theory that Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY 
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On the other hand, the Court’s jurisprudence under the Commerce 
Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause has encouraged 
treating citizens as members of a single national polity.  Invoking a 
variety of contexts, the Court has refused to allow states to favor their 
own.273  It has sought to create an environment in which individuals and 
businesses can readily travel,274 conduct business,275 and even retain 
 
L. REV. 1289, 1290, 1305-09 (2004) (explaining Court’s various judicial federalism doctrines 
that accord authority to state courts because Court views state tribunals as highly 
autonomous and as equal partners with federal courts in enforcing federal law).  Professor 
Pushaw notes that the Court has crafted numerous doctrines that enable federal judges to 
decline jurisdiction in order to allow state judiciaries to hear such cases, including the 
justiciability doctrine, abstention, the well-pleaded complaint rule, the adequate and 
independent state grounds doctrine, and sovereign immunity.  Id. at 1305. 
 273 The Court’s interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2 of the Constitution and the Court’s aggressive response to regulations and taxes 
that tend to burden out-of-state businesses signal an evolving theory of national citizenship 
that seeks to promote greater integration of citizens across state lines.  Saenz v. Roe, 526 
U.S. 489, 504 (1999) (invalidating California welfare statute under Privileges and 
Immunities Clause because it unjustly discriminated against new residents and aimed to 
stem tide of people moving across state borders); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 
313 (1992) (finding state use tax unconstitutional under Dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis where defendant lacked substantial nexus to taxing state, reflecting “structural 
concerns about the effects of state regulation on the national economy”); Supreme Court of 
N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 283, 287-88 (1985) (finding that Privileges and Immunities 
Clause prevented New Hampshire from discriminating against nonresidents by denying 
those nonresidents the right to practice law there because New Hampshire’s residency rule 
lacked “substantial reason” for “difference in treatment” that did not bear substantial or 
close relation to state’s given reason for residency requirement); Peter D. Enrich, Saving the 
States from Themselves:  Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 377, 431-33 (1996) (explaining that Court’s focal point in its tax jurisprudence 
is discriminatory nature of state tax provisions that overly burden out-of-state 
competitors); Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, Saenz Sans Prophecy:  Does the Privileges or 
Immunities Revival Portend the Future — Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 110, 141 (1999) (noting that principles underlying Saenz decision were animated by 
concerns for “interstate comity”).  The Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
reveals similar centralizing principles.  See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. 
Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 584 (1997) (extending implications of Dormant Commerce 
Clause to nonprofit enterprises); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ 
Rights:  A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 123 (2004) 
(arguing that Camps Newfound decision suggests that Rehnquist Court was pursuing 
“structural federalism jurisprudence” that belied its “reputation as a pro-states’ rights 
court”); Weinstein, supra note 168, at 285-86 (explaining that Court’s Dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence promotes “‘common market’ approach to commerce among states by 
invalidating laws that ‘balkanize’ free trade” and thus generating federal restrictions on 
state power to promote economic harmony among states). 
 274 Dunn v. Blumenstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) (finding that “the freedom to travel 
includes the ‘freedom to enter and abide in any State in the Union’” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 275 Piper, 470 U.S. at 279-80 (explaining that Privileges and Immunities Clause “was 
intended to create a national economic union . . . .  [And] therefore [it is] not surprising that 
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welfare benefits across state lines.276  In so doing, the Court privileges the 
efficient operation of interstate commerce and the integration of the 
nation into a single market and polity over individuals’ ties with 
particular states. 
Notions of state sovereignty over a nonresident’s in-forum activities 
accord with the centralizing rhetoric underlying the Court’s judicial 
federalism jurisprudence.  Upholding a state’s judicial authority over 
VoIP communications sent across its borders supports the notion that 
state courts are not beset by bias against nonresidents and can fairly hear 
all claims before them.  The constructive presence theory also honors the 
Court’s increasing recognition that individuals enjoy jurisdictionally 
significant relationships with many states by acknowledging that 
nonresidents’ communications with VoIP subscribers in a variety of fora 
can give rise to disputes affecting interests in those states.  This approach 
recognizes that facilitating the resolution of these disputes in some forum 
is important to promoting seamless commerce across state lines. 
By contrast, favoring the implied contract theory, as Michiana and 
Denver Truck do, undermines the notion of national citizenship.  This 
misguided approach effectively establishes that states have the exclusive 
right to hear claims against their own citizens involving borderless 
communications.  Forcing an injured party to bear the cost and 
inconvenience of traveling to the defendant’s home state to obtain 
redress could deter some businesses from entering into interstate 
commerce.277  Only a strong presumption of state courts’ 
untrustworthiness, which is wholly inconsistent with the values 
underlying the Court’s judicial federalism, could justify rolling back the 
 
this Court repeatedly has found that ‘one of the privileges which the Clause guarantees to 
citizens of State A is that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality with 
the citizens of that State’” (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948))); Kassel v. 
Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981) (holding that Iowa law regulating 
length of trucks driving on its roads impermissibly burdened “interstate flow of goods by 
truck” and was therefore unconstitutional under Dormant Commerce Clause); Hicklin v. 
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 533-34 (1978) (invalidating statute requiring that residents be hired in 
preference to nonresidents for positions related to development of state’s oil and gas 
resources); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 83 (1980) (arguing that 
Privileges and Immunities Clause was “intended and has been interpreted to mean” that 
“whatever entitlements those living in a state see fit to vote themselves will generally be 
extended” to out-of-state visitors). 
 276 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506-07 (explaining that California’s welfare legislation effectively 
deterred welfare applicants from moving to California). 
 277 At a minimum, it would deter them from obtaining VoIP numbers with out-of-state 
area codes, which may be a necessary prerequisite to effective competition in those 
markets.  This would frustrate the Court’s efforts to prevent state lines from insulating 
markets from competitive pressures. 
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clock to the nineteenth century rule of Pennoyer.  Thus, a proper 
recognition of the state sovereignty principle in the minimum contacts 
doctrine would acknowledge that states maintain significant ties with 
nonresidents who transmit communications to VoIP users in their 
borders and that state courts are competent to hear those claims. 
C. Alternative Means for Protecting Nonresidents from a Sovereign State’s 
Unreasonable Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
A nonresident’s implied agreement is not essential to ensure that a 
state’s exercise of its sovereign judicial authority over nonresidents 
comports with due process.  The reasonableness of a state’s exercise of its 
judicial authority can be determined by assessing the state’s regulatory 
interest in the nonresident’s territorial conduct.278  In this analysis, courts 
should examine the objective impact of the nonresident’s litigation-
raising local activity.279  To that end, the inquiry is claim-specific.280  
When a state has a strong regulatory interest in the nonresident’s in-
forum activity, the nonresident’s conduct would justify the state’s 
exercise of its judicial authority so long as “fair play and substantial 
justice” supported that result.281  A state’s weak interest in the 
 
 278 Stein, supra note 124, at 413 (arguing that appropriate jurisdictional inquiry under 
minimum contacts doctrine is “not whether a defendant has surrendered his or her liberty, 
but whether the state’s assertion of judicial authority sufficiently advances its regulatory 
interests to justify the attendant burden that such a proceeding would impose upon 
conduct outside of its territory”); Weisburd, supra note 91, at 405-06 (urging Court to 
replace purposefulness inquiry with rule that honors territorial sovereignty of states, such 
as examination of defendant’s “liability-raising” conduct in state’s territory that warrants 
state regulation); see Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (sanctioning 
extraterritorial jurisdiction only where nonresidents establish meaningful ties to forum); 
Brilmayer, supra note 126, at 81-82, 85 (arguing that state adjudicative authority is 
reasonable where states have regulatory interest in nonresidents forum activities that 
constitute “substantively relevant events”). 
 279 See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-75 (1985). 
 280 Stein, supra note 124, at 413.  Under Professor Stein’s “regulatory precision” 
approach, due process “tests jurisdictional authority in relation to the nature of a 
defendant’s activity, and the regulatory claims of all states with an interest in that activity.  
It is multilateral, not bilateral.  It is claim-specific, not trans-substantive.”  Id. 
 281 Conflict of laws jurisprudence and a state’s laws can guide state courts in assessing a 
state’s interest in a particular nonresident’s in-forum, litigation-related activity.  Verizon 
Online Services v. Ralsky, for example, involved nonresident defendants who sent millions 
of harmful spam e-mails to Virginia residents over the Virginia plaintiff’s Internet service.  
203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 617 (E.D. Va. 2002).  The defendants claimed that the Virginia court 
lacked jurisdiction over them since they never knew where they sent the e-mails and thus 
never purposefully availed themselves of Virginia’s laws.  Id. at 619.  The Virginia court 
found the defendants’ argument unpersuasive.  Id. at 617, 619.  The court explained that the 
defendants could not escape Virginia’s judicial jurisdiction “by simply pleading ignorance 
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nonresident’s local conduct, on the other hand, would suggest that the 
state’s exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.282  Some courts 
have moved in this direction in cases involving harmful e-mails sent to 
forum residents.283  Moreover, as the Court’s decisions in the punitive 
damages arena284 illustrate, a nonresident’s implied agreement is not 
 
as to where [plaintiff’s] servers were located.”  Id. at 620.  “To do so would constitute a 
manifest injustice to Verizon and Virginia” that would offend Virginia’s sovereign power 
to try causes in its courts, and the Due Process Clause does not give defendants a free pass 
to commit torts with “impunity.”  Id.  The court, rather than asking if the defendants 
purposefully connected with Virginia, assessed Virginia’s interest in the defendants’ in-
state activities to determine whether Virginia’s exercise of its judicial authority would be 
reasonable under the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 617.  The court, relying on the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, explained that a “state has an especial interest in exercising 
judicial jurisdiction over those who commit torts within its territory.”  Id. (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 36.1 (1988)).  The court held that Virginia’s 
interest in the defendants’ tortious conduct, coupled with the fact that the defendants 
intended to send the harmful e-mails that caused significant harm to Virginia residents, 
illustrated that the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants satisfied the 
“contacts” inquiry of the minimum contacts doctrine.  Id. at 618.  The court separately 
addressed whether its exercise of jurisdiction would comport with “fair play and 
substantial justice” and found that fairness also supported the court’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over the defendants.  Id. at 621. 
 282 See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 637 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“[A] state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who is 
present within its territory unless the individual’s relationship to the state is so attenuated 
as to make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.”); Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 617 
(“A state’s interest in exercising personal jurisdiction over a tortfeasor takes on a stronger 
role than in other contexts such as a contract dispute.”). 
 283 Courts have refused to allow the purposefulness inquiry to divest states of their 
judicial authority over nonresidents who sent harmful e-mails to forum residents.  See, e.g., 
Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 617-18; Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F. Supp. 2d 773, 778-
79 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (finding jurisdiction over defendant in federal district court in 
Mississippi in tort case where defendant sent e-mail all over world, including to 
Mississippi residents, that falsely suggested plaintiff’s involvement in pornographic 
website because it would not be “unfair” to subject defendant to jurisdiction in Mississippi 
since defendant sent e-mail solicitation for pecuniary gain “at her own peril” and thus 
could not claim that “it was not reasonably foreseeable that she could be haled into a 
distant jurisdiction to answer for the ramifications of that solicitation”); Fenn v. MLeads 
Enters., Inc., 103 P.3d 156, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (finding that defendant “should have 
anticipated being haled into court wherever its email were received, even in Utah”). 
 284 See supra note 159 and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court’s due process 
analysis of state punitive damages awards).  In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
v. Campbell, the Court held that due process “dictate[s] that a person receive fair notice not 
only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the 
penalty that a State may impose.”  538 U.S. 408, 417-18 (2003).  In assessing whether the 
state punitive damages award comported with the Due Process Clause, the Court did not 
invoke concepts of implied agreement.  Id.  Instead, the Court examined the state’s 
territorial authority over the defendant’s conduct and the excessive nature of the award in 
light of the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the difference between the actual 
harm inflicted and the award, and the amount of the award compared to awards in similar 
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essential to ensuring that a state’s exercise of its sovereign authority 
comports with due process. 
Although this rule would expand personal jurisdiction to cases not 
meeting the purposefulness requirement, other means exist to protect 
nonresidents from being haled into distant courts unfairly.  Under 
existing doctrine, even if a state’s exercise of its judicial authority would 
be reasonable given its strong regulatory interest in the nonresident’s in-
forum conduct, its courts lack personal jurisdiction over that nonresident 
where the litigation would overly burden the parties, the court system, 
and the substantive policies of the several states.  In that regard, Asahi285 
illustrates that the “fair play and substantial justice” concerns provide 
meaningful protection for nonresidents defendants. 
Aside from the protections offered by current doctrine and this 
proposal, concerns about a nonresident’s inconvenience also can be 
accommodated at the “subconstitutional level using the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens.”286  The forum non conveniens doctrine, for 
example, permits courts to adjust for “potential inequities between the 
parties” by facilitating conditional dismissals — “a device not available 
under the ‘black-or-white’ approach to jurisdiction.”287 
Some may argue that this proposal contravenes the notion that an 
individual’s consent is essential for the legitimacy of a state’s assertion of 
its judicial authority.288  This argument fails for both theoretical and 
practical reasons.  First, an individual’s consent, as conceived in current 
personal jurisdiction law, is “hypothetical.”289  As Professor Brilmayer 
has observed, “theories of tacit consent assume almost exactly what they 
set out to prove.”290 
 
cases.  Id. at 419-20. 
 285 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987); see supra notes 
195, 197, and 200 and accompanying text. 
 286 Perdue, supra note 124, at 469. 
 287 Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction over and Enforcement 
of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 819 (1988). 
 288 See, e.g., Margaret G. Stewart, A New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 5, 19 (1989); Transgrud, supra note 92, at 884-85. 
 289 Perdue, supra note 124, at 465. 
 290 Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1304 (1989).  
Scholars have long argued, on other grounds, that purposefulness has no place in the law 
of personal jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Stein, supra note 86, at 734-35 (arguing that exchange 
justification in minimum contacts analysis is flawed because “if purposeful availment 
implies contractual fairness, whether by actual or constructive contract, it does not work”); 
Weisburd, supra note 91, at 405 (arguing that because personal jurisdiction rules concerns 
limits on territorial sovereignty, “intent” requirement “disregards territorial sovereignty 
model it claims to be applying”).  An argument, however, can be made that the Court’s 
decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota undermines this Article’s contention that the 
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Second, as a practical matter, purposefulness can no longer serve as an 
instrument to measure the reasonableness of a state’s exercise of its 
judicial authority because its notions of “fair warning” and implied 
agreement operate under last century’s assumption that individuals 
communicate from known locations.  In the twenty-first century where 
area codes do not accurately signify geographic locations, the 
purposefulness inquiry is obsolete.  Indeed, individuals today know 
their communications may be transmitted to VoIP or cellular phones and 
are thus “fairly warned” that their calls, e-mails, and faxes may be 
received in unexpected locations.  Individuals, in that sense, can be said 
to have “assumed the risk” 291 of the jurisdictional consequences of their 
remote communications. 
In the hypothetical in the prior subpart, A contacted Pennsylvania via 
the phone calls and faxes it made to B there.  Because the allegedly 
misleading remarks that gave rise to B’s fraud claim essentially occurred 
in Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania likely would have a strong interest in 
 
purposefulness inquiry is not essential to the protection of a nonresident’s due process 
guarantees.  504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992) (upholding North Dakota’s jurisdiction to tax 
Delaware mail-order company under Due Process Clause because company had 
purposefully directed its activities to North Dakota residents).  While Quill affirms the 
significance of purposefulness in the law of due process, it does not undermine the 
argument made here that the purposefulness inquiry jeopardizes state regulatory authority 
and unnecessarily protects defendants beyond the guarantees of due process in borderless 
communications where defendants lack knowledge of the geographic location of 
individuals they contact.  Quill is distinguishable because the Court affirmed the 
significance of purposefulness to the due process inquiry in a case where the defendant 
directed its activity to a known location – catalogues and products sent through the mail to 
North Dakota residents.  See id. at 302, 308.  Thus, in Quill, the “fair warning” of the 
purposefulness inquiry was ably satisfied by the defendant’s action of mailing catalogues 
and products to North Dakota.  There, the defendant knew he reached out to, and made 
taxable sales in, North Dakota, much in the same way that the defendant in Burger King 
knew that in sending mail to the plaintiff in Florida he risked litigation there.  See Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).  But in a world of borderless VoIP 
communications where parties do not, and cannot, predict the home fora of their contacts, 
the purposefulness requirement leads to anomalous results.  For a more in-depth treatment 
of Quill, see generally John A. Swain, Cybertaxation and the Commerce Clause:  Entity Isolation 
or Affiliate Nexus?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 419, 425 (2002) (discussing immunizing effect of Quill 
on companies seeking to avoid state taxation and suggesting alternative methods of 
establishing physical presence in forum), and compare David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal 
Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2599 (2005) (exploring how Quill diminishes states’ 
authority to tax commercial activity within their borders). 
 291 Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Va. 2002) (upholding 
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who sent millions of spam e-mails 
through plaintiff Verizon’s servers because defendants “assumed the risk” of injuring 
valuable property in Virgnia, even though defendants claimed to have no knowledge of 
destination of their e-mails). 
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regulating A’s allegedly fraudulent remarks transmitted to its territory.292  
The “fair play and substantial justice” considerations would determine if 
B’s inconvenience, judicial efficiency, and the state’s interests would 
counsel divesting the Pennsylvania court of jurisdiction over B. 
This standard would advance the critical concerns of the law of 
personal jurisdiction.  It would secure a state’s sovereign authority over 
harmful communications transmitted to its territory, protect 
nonresidents from unreasonable assertions of state judicial authority, 
and ensure that the exercise of jurisdiction would not unduly burden the 
parties, the courts, and the shared states’ interests. 
CONCLUSION 
Modern personal jurisdiction law has long rested securely on the twin 
pillars of territorial presence and implied contract.  This edifice, 
however, cannot stand.  These concepts will come into irreconcilable 
conflict when applied to the borderless communications of the twenty-
first century.  The Supreme Court designed the modern minimum 
contacts doctrine to expand state adjudicative authority over 
nonresidents who knowingly established their presence in a state 
through twentieth-century transportation or communication 
technologies.  In the traditional telephone system, where area codes let 
callers know the states they contacted, the concepts of in-forum presence 
and implied contract operate in sync.  But since the Court last revisited 
personal jurisdiction, communication technologies have made radical 
advances.  Twenty-first century technologies like VoIP now remove the 
geographic marker from all of our communications, including e-mail, 
voice, fax, file-sharing, and real-time video conferencing. 
Given a defendant’s inability to purposefully direct VoIP calls to 
particular fora, the borderless communications of the twenty-first 
century cannot fit in the minimum contacts paradigm.  This will force the 
Court to decide whether constructive presence or implied contract is the 
primary operating principle of personal jurisdiction law.  Some lower 
courts, addressing the jurisdictional import of cellular phone contacts, 
have deemed the implied contract theory paramount, finding harmful 
communications directed to cellular phone users jurisdictionally 
 
 292 See generally Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984) (explaining 
that “it is beyond dispute that [a state] has a significant interest in redressing injuries that 
actually occur within the [s]tate” because “[a] state has an especial interest in exercising 
judicial jurisdiction over those who commit torts within its territory” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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insignificant because such calls cannot be directed to particular places. 
This Article has shown the mechanistic short-sightedness of this 
approach and its implicit disregard of state sovereignty.  Although voice, 
fax, and data communications in the twenty-first century will 
increasingly lack geographic markers, we nonetheless live in a world of 
territorial boundaries where state regulatory powers matter.  To avoid 
the wholesale elimination of extraterritorial state authority and a cloak of 
immunity over all remote communications, the implied contract theory 
should not be sustained.  Legitimate due process concerns can and 
should be addressed without the artifice of an implied contract to protect 
defendants from abusive process.  This result promotes a healthy 
federalism, reconciling some seemingly inconsistent centrifugal and 
centripetal themes in this Court’s jurisprudence, and promotes judicial 
efficiency. 
